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Abstract
The thesis consists of three chapters that investigate informational asymmetry
mechanisms surrounding financial institutions.
In the first chapter, my co-authors and I develop a theoretical model to analyse
the effect of competition on the conflict of interest arising from the issuer pay com-
pensation model of the credit rating industry. We find that relative to monopoly,
rating agencies are more likely to inflate ratings under competition, resulting in lower
expected welfare. These results do not depend on the presence of ratings shopping,
but instead focus on the trade-off between maintaining reputation (to increase profits
in the future) and inflating ratings today (to increase current profits).
In the second chapter, I document a direct link between stock mispricing, as
proxied by mutual fund flow-driven price pressure, and corporate investment. One
standard deviation increase in stock price pressure leads to an increase of 1.3 percent
in investment. High price pressure firms with high investments have lower future stock
returns and lower future operational performance than high price pressure firms with
low investments. Investment sensitivity to price pressure is stronger for firms that are
less financially constrained, firms with high churn rates (shorter horizon) and firms
with high R&D intensity (with more opaque assets). Finally, investment sensitivity
to price pressure remains positive and significant for firms that do not engage in
seasoned equity offerings around the investment period, suggesting there is a channel
between stock price pressure and corporate investment that is independent of external
financing.
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The third chapter documents a pronounced market timing ability of institutional
investors when it comes to selling individual stocks. Based on more than 8 million
institutional trades over the period 1999 to 2009, my co-authors and I document that
(i) large (block) sales of institutional investors correlate with future negative excess
returns, while stock purchases do not predict positive excess returns at the stock level,
(ii) the one-sided successful market timing of block liquidations is more pronounced if
the block represents a larger share of the investor portfolio or/and the stock capital-
ization, (iii) international investors have a weaker one-sided timing ability for block
liquidations. The evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that proximity of block
holding investors to management provides important inside information advantages.
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Chapter 1
Credit Rating and Competition
Co-authored with Zijun Liu (London School of Economics) and Pragyan Deb (Lon-
don School of Economics)
1.1 Introduction
The credit rating industry aims to offer investors valuable information about is-
suers in need of financing. Due to the asymmetric information between the issuers
and the investors, credit ratings often have pivotal impacts on the issuers’ financ-
ing outcomes. Before the 1970s, the rating agencies relied on an investor-pay model
wherein investors subscribed to ratings released by the agencies and these subscrip-
tion revenues were the main source of income for the rating agencies. However owing
to the ‘public good’ nature of ratings1 and the increase in free riding, rating agencies
switched to the current issuer-pay model and started charging issuers for ratings. As
things stand today, the largest source of income for the rating agencies2 are the fees
paid by the issuers the rating agencies are supposed to impartially rate.3 This tempts
rating agencies to rate better than what fundamentals suggest.
1This was officially recognized by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 1970s
when the big three rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch were designated self-
regulatory entities. See Lowenstein (2008).
2It is also interesting to note that rating agencies are some of the most profitable businesses.
Moody’s was the third most profitable company in the S&P 500-stock index from 2002 to 2007,
based on pretax margins (ahead of both Microsoft and Google).
3Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s Examinations of Select Credit
Rating Agencies by the Staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, p.9.
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Such behavior has been criticized heavily since the onset of the recent financial cri-
sis, in particularly over the AAA ratings that have been issued to complex structured
products. Rating agencies played a crucial role in the rapid growth of structured
finance. According to Fitch Ratings (2007), around 60% of all global structured
products were AAA-rated, compared to less than 1% for corporate and financial is-
sues. Following a subsequent jump in default rates, rating agencies lowered the credit
ratings on structured products widely, indicating that the initial ratings were likely
inaccurate.
A number of empirical papers find that the conflicts of interest problem play an
important role in rating agencies’ decisions. Griffin and Tang (2011) give striking
empirical evidence of ratings inflation by rating agencies. They compare the CDO
assumptions made by the ratings department and by the surveillance department
within the same rating agency, and find the former uses more favorable assumptions.
Moreover, it appears that the signals from the surveillance department were ignored
and the CDOs favored by the ratings department were subsequently downgraded.
Xia and Strobl (2012) provide further evidence of ratings inflation as a result of the
issuer-pay model. They compare the ratings issued by Standard & Poor’s Ratings
Services (S&P) which follows the issuer-pay model to those issued by the Egan-Jones
Rating Company (EJR) which adopts the investor-pay model. They find that S&P
inflates more relatively to EJR when S&P’s conflict of interest is more acute.
It is often suggested that introducing more competition between rating agencies
may help alleviate the conflicts of interest problem. However, a growing body of
academic literature suggests that this may not be the case. Skreta and Veldkamp
(2009) show that, in the presence of asset complexity and ratings shopping, compe-
tition leads to lower welfare in equilibrium. Bolton, Freixas and Shapiro (2012) also
find that competition leads to more ratings inflation as issuers are able to more easily
shop for ratings and that this effect is particular acute in boom times, when investors
15
are more trusting. The contribution of our paper is to show that even in the absence
of ratings shopping and asset complexity, and with rational investors, competition
delivers lower welfare than monopoly. Our results stem from the fact that enhanced
competition in the form of a new entrant reduces the incumbent’s market share for
ratings. This market sharing effect reduces the rent that rating agencies can derive
from maintaining their reputation, encouraging ratings inflation even in the absence
of ratings shopping. Our results suggest that current regulatory attempts to reduce
ratings shopping4 may not eliminate ratings inflation due to the underlying conflicts
of interest problem.
We develop an infinite horizon model where rating agencies compete for market
share and face a trade-off between reputation and current fees. Competition in our
model has two effects - the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. Com-
petition decreases ratings inflation through the disciplining effect as rating agencies
have incentives to maintain or gain the market leadership. This channel is generally
emphasized when it is argued that enhanced competition between rating agencies can
resolve the conflict of interest. However, this ignores the other effect of competition
- the reward from maintaining reputation is lower because competition implies that
the market is shared between a larger number of rating agencies. We call this the
market-sharing effect and study the impact of competition on the behavior of rating
agencies by exploring the interaction between these two opposite effects. Our results
suggest that on balance the latter effect dominates and higher competition results in
greater ratings inflation.
Given the structure of the market - with S&P’s and Moody’s having 80% of market
share,5 we model competition amongst the rating agencies in a duopolistic setting.
In our model, issuers need a good rating to finance their projects. Rating agencies,
4See Sangiorgi and Spatt (2011). Note that in a rational expectations setting, ratings inflation
might arise due to the possibility of unpublished ratings, which might be countered by regulation.
5The figure stands at 95% if we include the third major player, Fitch.
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which can be of two types - honest or strategic, perfectly observe the quality of the
project and can either give the issuer a good rating or refuse rating. An honest rating
agency always gives good ratings to good projects and no rating to bad projects while
a strategic rating agency acts to maximize its expected profits. Neither investors nor
issuers know for sure if a rating agency is honest and they Bayesian update on the
reputation of the rating agencies, i.e. the probability that a rating agency is honest.
The market share of the rating agency is modeled such that rating agencies with
higher reputation attract more projects. Hence the rating agencies face a trade-off
between current income and reputation which determines their future market share
and income.
We compare the behavior of rating agencies between the monopolistic case and
a simultaneous6 duopolistic case.7 We first derive closed-form solutions in a three-
period model and show that the lax behavior of a rating agency increases with the
reputation of its competitor, i.e. competition leads to more lax behavior and the
market-sharing effect dominates. We then compute numerical solutions under an
infinite-period setting, which enables us to relax parameter restrictions and extend
the horizon of rating agencies, thereby making reputation more important for them.
Our results show that the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining
effect when the degree of competition is sufficiently high, i.e. the reputation of the
competitor is high. Moreover, we find that expected welfare is higher in the monopoly
case than in the duopoly case as long as the reputation of the entrant rating agency
(the competitor) is not greater than that of the incumbent rating agency. In our
model, expected welfare rises only when the new entrant has a higher reputation vis-
à-vis the incumbent, a situation which appears unlikely. We verify that the results
6There is no incentive for herding as this is not a sequential model: rating agencies are either
monopolists or have one competitor with known reputation.
7Although we only focus on competition in a duopolistic setting, our results intuitively extend
to situations with higher degrees of competition.
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are robust to different parameter specifications and on balance, our results suggest
that increasing competition is likely to result in more ratings inflation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature.
In Section 1.3 we outline the basic features of our model. Section 1.4 describes the
equilibrium in our model and Section 1.5 solves the model solution in a three-period
setting. In Section 1.6 we solve the model numerically in an infinite horizon. We go on
to compare the behavior of rating agencies under monopoly and duopoly and discuss
the expected welfare consequences of enhanced competition. Section 1.7 concludes.
The proofs and additional robustness checks are presented in the Appendix.
1.2 Literature Review
Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet (2009) demonstrate that reputational concerns
are not enough to solve the conflict of interest problem. In equilibrium, rating agencies
are likely to behave laxly, i.e. rate bad projects as good and are prone to reputation
cycles. Our model innovates by introducing competition through an endogenous
market share function and studying how competition affects the behavior of rating
agencies.
Becker and Milbourn (2011) lends support to our results by providing an empirical
test of the impact of competition on rating agencies. They measure competition
using the growth of Fitch’s market share and find three pieces of evidence. First, the
overall standards of ratings issued by S&P and Moody’s increased (closer to the top
AAA rating) with competition, so that ratings became more ‘friendly’. Second, the
correlation between bond yields and ratings fell as competition increased, implying
that ratings became less informative. Third, equity prices started reacting more
negatively to rating downgrades, suggesting a lower bar for rating categories. Their
findings are consistent with our results that competition will tend to lower the quality
of ratings in the market.
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A recent paper by Xia (2012) provides some contrasting empirical evidence. The
author compares S&P’s rating quality before and after the entry of an investor paid
rating agency and finds a significant improvement in the quality of S&P’s ratings
following the entry of the new rating agency. This result however is completely
compatible with our model since an investor paid rating agency in our setting would
be perfectly honest and our results suggest that in cases in which the incumbent RA
has lower reputation than the entrant RA, welfare improvement is possible.
There has been an extensive literature that studies competition through reputa-
tion. For example, Horner (2002) shows that the incentive to maintain good reputa-
tion and stay in the market can induce good firms to exert higher effort and try to
distinguish themselves from the bad ones. The adverse effects of competition on the
building and maintenance of reputation has been studied by Klein and Leﬄer (1981).
They argue that when faced with a choice between supplying high quality products or
low quality ones, firms would be induced to supply high quality products only when
the expected value of future income given a high reputation outweighs the short-
run gain of lying. Bar-Isaac (2003) points out that the overall effect of competition
on reputational incentives is ambiguous and may be non-monotonic, since increased
competition can reduce the discounted value of maintaining a high reputation on the
one hand, but can also lead to a more severe punishment for low reputation on the
other. This intuition is very close to ours, except that we use a richer framework in
the context of credit rating agencies.
Bouvard and Levy (2009) examine the trade-off between reputation and profits
of rating agencies in a competitive setting and find that the threat of entry attenu-
ates reputational effects. Mariano (2012) models how reputational concerns change
rating agencies incentives to reveal private information. In a setting in which rating
agencies have access to private and public information, her results provide a mech-
anism in which competition between rating agencies might inflate the ratings even
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in the absence of conflicts of interest. Compared to the above, the innovation of our
paper is to endogenize the market share of rating agencies and to explore the welfare
implications of competition.
Damiano, Hao and Suen (2008) study how the rating scheme may affect the strate-
gic behavior of rating agencies. They compare ratings inflation among centralized (all
firms are rated together) and decentralized (firms are rated separately) rating schemes.
When the quality of projects is weakly correlated, centralized rating dominates be-
cause decentralized rating leads to lower ratings inflation. The reverse holds when
the correlation is strong. Sangiorgi, Sokobin and Chester (2009) model and analyze
the equilibrium structure of ratings reflected by ratings shopping. They interpret how
the correlation between different rating agencies’ models influence ratings shopping
and bias. They also use selection as an equilibrium interpretation for notching by a
rival rating agency. Moreover, they show that a higher cost of obtaining indicative
ratings lead to inflation in published ratings, as they are obtained less frequently.
Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham and Vickery (2010) study credit ratings on sub-
prime and Alt-A mortgage-backed-securities (MBS) deals issued between 2001 and
2007. Although they find that the fraction of highly rated securities in each deal
is decreasing in mortgage credit risk, their results suggest a progressive decline in
standards around the MBS market peak between the start of 2005 and mid-2007.
White (2010) gives a historic overview of the market of the credit rating agencies
and suggest that the regulatory framework contributed to the subprime mortgage
debacle and associated financial crisis. They highlight how the major reliance of
regulators on major rating agencies propelled them to the center of US bond markets
and led the mistakes by those rating agencies to have serious consequences for the
financial sector.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2011) explore how the labor market for analysts and their
incentives influence ratings accuracy. Motivated by the fact that rating analysts were
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fleeing the rating agencies for better paid investment bank jobs, they build a 2 period
model in which analysts work for rating agencies in period 1 and can leave them to a
better paid investment bank in period 2. They show that ratings accuracy increases
with monitoring and also with investment bank profitability (as analysts train harder
in period 1), but it is non-monotonic in the probability of the analyst getting a job
in the investment bank.
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2012) analyze how reputational concerns of rating agencies
vary over the business cycle. A rating agency is more likely to issue less-accurate
ratings in boom times, when income from fees is high, competition in the labor
market for analysts is tough, and default probabilities for the securities rated are
low. They also show that competition among the rating agencies delivers similar
qualitative results. However, competition is not the main focus of their paper and is
modeled through an exogenous function between the degree of competition and the
fees received by rating agencies.
1.3 Model Setup
We consider a discrete time setting with 3 types of agents – the issuers, the rating
agencies (RA) and the investors. Each period, we have a new issuer 8 with a project
that requires financing. We assume that issuers do not have funds of their own and
need to obtain outside financing. The investors have funds and are willing to invest
in the project provided they are convinced that it is profitable to do so. The role of
the RA in this setting is to issue ratings that convince investors to provide financing.
More formally, each period we have one issuer that has a project which lasts for one
period. All projects have a fixed pay-off Φ if successful and 0 otherwise and require
8New Issuer implies that it is a one shot game for the issuer and we rule out the possibility that
issuers try to maximize profits over multiple periods. This assumption also ensures that issuers have
the same belief as the investors about the reputation of the RAs. If we allow the same issuers to
approach the rating agencies in subsequent periods, then issuers will have more information than
investors.
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an investment of X. This required investment X is uniformly distributed over (a,b)
and its realization is observed by all agents. The uniform distribution assumption
ensures that we have a range of projects with different returns. Projects that require
low investment have high return and vice versa. We can get similar results if we
assume fixed investment with uncertain pay-off. The project is good with probability
λ and bad with probability 1− λ, and λ is independent of X. Good projects succeed
with probability pG and fail with probability (1− pG). Bad projects always fail.
We assume that a-priori projects are not worth financing without rating, i.e.
λpGΦ ≤ X. Further, the RAs can perfectly observe the type of project at no cost.
After observing the type, the RA can either issue a good rating (GR) or no rating
(NR). Note that we do not distinguish between bad rating and NR and abstract away
from a ratings scale. In our setup, a good rating is one that allows the issuer to
borrow from investors. It does not matter if this rating is AAA or A or BBB or even
C. As long as the rating allows the firm to get financing, we consider it to be a GR.
A bad rating in this setting will be a rating which does not enable a project to get
financing. This is the same outcome as a NR and thus, a bad rating and NR are
equivalent in our model.
The rating agency receives income I if it issues GR, and 0 otherwise.9 This
assumption arises from the conflict of interest in the ratings industry. Given the
non-transparent nature of the market and the widespread use of negotiated ratings,
issuers and RAs routinely have negotiations and consultations before an official rating
is issued. RAs, as part of their day-to-day operations, give their clients ‘creative
suggestions’ on how to repackage their portfolios or projects in order to get better
ratings. To quote former chief of Moody’s, Tom McGuire10
“The banks pay only if [the rating agency] delivers the desired rating. . .
9This is a standard simplifying assumption in the literature. See Mathis et al. (2009) and Skreta
and Veldkamp (2009).
10New York Times Magazine, Triple-A-Failure, April 27, 2008.
22
If Moody’s and a client bank don’t see eye-to-eye, the bank can either
tweak the numbers or try its luck with a competitor. . . ”
We assume that there are two types of RAs - honest and strategic . An honest
RA always issues a GR to a good project and NR to a bad project while a strategic
RA behaves strategically to maximize its expected future profits. The strategic RA
faces the following trade-off :
1. (Truthful) It can either be truthful and maintain its reputation, thus ensuring
profits in the future
2. (Lie) It can inflate ratings (give a good rating to a bad project) and get fees
now, at the cost of future profits
We consider a duopolistic setting of rating agencies.11 The type of the RA is chosen
ex ante by nature and is known only to the rating agency itself. The reputation of
the rating agency is defined as the probability that it is honest, denoted by qi, i ∈
{1, 2}. The reputation evolves over time depending on the ratings and outcome of
the projects. The strategy of the RA is xi, the probability the RA issues a GR to a
bad project.12
The investors (and issuers) have some priors about the types of the RAs and they
Bayesian update on their beliefs. Firstly, investors and issuers take into account the
rating and update the reputation of the RA, before observing the outcome of the
project. Given prior reputation qt,
If RA issues GR, qGRt =
λqt
λ+ (1− qt)(1− λ)x < qt (1.1)
If not rated, qNt+1 =
qt
1− x(1− qt) > qt (1.2)
11Given the structure of the market, with Moody’s and S&P controlling nearly 80% of the market,
we believe that this is a reasonable approximation of reality.
12Note that in equilibrium the strategic RA will always issue GR to a good project (see Section
1.4).
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If the project is issued a good rating by the RA, the investors update their beliefs
after observing the outcome of the project.
If the project succeeds, qSt+1 =
λpGqt
λpGqt + λpG(1− qt) = qt (1.3)
If the project fails, qFt+1 =
λ(1− pG)qt
λ(1− pG)qt + [λ(1− pG) + (1− λ)x](1− qt) < qt (1.4)
We make the simplifying assumption that each issuer can only approach one RA
for rating. Therefore, our model considers ratings shopping only to the extent that
the issuer and the rating agency have negotiations before an official rating is issued.
We do not explicitly study multiple ratings and herd behavior of the RAs. While
these are important issues that merit attention, they are not the focus of this paper.
Here we look at the competition for market share among rating agencies and show
that ratings inflation increases with competition.
Investors observe the rating decision and decide whether to invest. If they observe
a GR from a RA with reputation q, their subjective belief that the project will succeed
(using equation (1.1)) is given by
s(q, x) = qGRpG + (1− qGR) λpG
λ+ (1− λ)x
=
λq
λ+ (1− q)(1− λ)xpG +
(
1− λq
λ+ (1− q)(1− λ)x
)
λpG
λ+ (1− λ)x
=
λpG
λ+ (1− q)(1− λ)x (1.5)
Given the required investment level X, investors are willing to finance the project if
and only if X ≤ s(q, x)Φ, i.e. if the initial investment required for the project is
no greater than its expected pay-off. Without loss of generality, assume s(q1, x1) >
s(q2, x2). We have 3 cases:
1. If X is such that a good rating from either RA is enough, i.e X ≤ s(q, x)Φ for
both q1 and q2, the firm can approach either RA.13 We assume that in this case
13We assume that the issuers are only paid when projects succeed. This implies that the issuers
will be indifferent between RAs (with different reputation) given that both can guarantee financing.
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the firm will randomly choose one of the RAs, i.e. the project goes to both RAs
with equal probability.14
2. If s(q2, x2)Φ < X < s(q1, x1)Φ , i.e. only the high reputation RA can issue
ratings that can convince the investors to provide financing, hence the firm will
go to RA1 and not RA2.
3. If X > s(q1, x1)Φ, the project does not get financed.
a
Φ
s2 s1
b
Φ
X
Φ
Market Share of RA1 Market Share of RA2
Figure 1.1: The Market for Ratings
Thus we get the following result as illustrated in Figure 1.1 -
Probability that a project comes to RA1 =
(s1 − s2) + 12
(
s2 − aΦ
)
b
Φ
− a
Φ
Probability that a project comes to RA2 =
1
2
(
s2 − aΦ
)
b
Φ
− a
Φ
We set (a, b) = (λpGΦ, pGΦ), because any project with X < λpGΦ does not need
a rating to be financed, and any project with X > pGΦ is never worth financing
ex-ante.
The probability that a project comes to RA1 =
s1 − 12
(
s2 + λpG
)
pG(1− λ) (1.6)
The probability that a project comes to RA2 =
1
2
(
s2 − λpG
)
pG(1− λ) (1.7)
Reputation plays a critical role in our model. The market share of the RAs depends
on s, and thus on reputation q. Since the income from giving a GR is constant
(denoted by I), the future profits of the RA will solely depend on its market share.
14Note that this is one of infinite many possible equilibria. Since the issuers are indifferent, we
have an equilibrium for all probabilities (α ∈ (0, 1)) of approaching a specific RA . We focus on the
case where α = 12 . Our qualitative results do not depend on the choice of α.
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Moreover, the RA with a higher reputation enjoys additional benefits of being the
market leader, because it owns entirely the proportion of the market that cannot be
rated by its competitor but can be rated by itself, whereas its competitor can only
share its market with the leader. This creates incentives for RAs to maintain or gain
the market leader position and hence disciplines the RAs through competition.
We can now see that competition (modeled through market share) has two effects
on lax behavior: the market-sharing effect and the disciplining effect. The market-
sharing effect refers to the fact that the RA finds lying and receiving income today
more attractive as its expected future income is shared with another RA, and the
disciplining effect refers to the fact that the RA finds lying less attractive in order to
maintain/gain the advantages of being a market leader. We will show later that the
market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect and hence competition
aggravates the lax behavior of RAs in general.
1.4 Equilibrium
Definition 1. The equilibrium in our model is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium such
that, at each period t, the strategic RA always
(i) Gives a good rating to a good project.
(ii) Gives a good rating to a bad project with probability xt, where 0 ≤ xt ≤ 1.
We look for a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the sense that the equilibrium is
“memoryless", i.e. the strategy of the strategic RA only depends on the current
reputation of its opponent and itself. The equilibrium is also “symmetric", as the
strategy function of both RAs (if they are both strategic) is the same. However, the
RAs do not take actions simultaneously.
Let RA1 be a strategic RA and let Vt(q1, q2) denote its discounted future profits,
given its reputation q1 and its competitor’s reputation q2, and let δ be the discount
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Figure 1.2: Decision-tree for Strategic RA1
rate. The RA’s new reputation after it gives NR and the failure of a project following
a GR are denoted by qN1 and qF1 respectively. A successful project with a GR leaves
the RA’s reputation unchanged. Note that qF1 and qN1 are functions of the strategy
of the RA and its current reputation level. For notational simplicity, we suppress the
time subscript of these reputation-updating functions.
Figure 1.2 shows the decision tree of RA1. Suppose it is approached for rating. If
the project is good, RA1 gives it a GR and gets income I (see Proposition 2 below).
On the other hand, if the project is bad, RA1 strategically decides whether to give a
GR and get fees I or refuse rating. In case of NR, RA1’s reputation rises as it gets
a larger market share in the future. In case of a GR, RA1’s reputation falls if the
project fails and remains the same if it succeeds. This in turn determines the RA1’s
expected future income. A similar analysis applies if RA2 is approached for rating.
In this case the fees go to RA2 and RA1 is only indirectly affected through a change
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in RA2’s reputation. Note that since RA1 does not know the type of RA2, it has to
take into account the possibility that RA2 is either honest or strategic.
Vt(q1, q2) = P (RA1rates)
{
P (Good)
[
I + pGδVt+1(q1, q2) + (1− pG)δVt+1(qF1 , q2)
]
+ P (Bad)
[
x1(q1, q2)
(
I + δVt+1(q
F
1 , q2)
)
+
(
1− x1(q1, q2)
)
δVt+1(q
N
1 , q2)
]}
+ P (RA2rates)
{
P (Good)
[
pGδVt+1(q1, q2) + (1− pG)δVt+1(q1, qF2 )
]
+ P (Bad)
[
(1− q2)x2(q1, q2)δV (q1, qF2 ) +
[
q2 +
(
1− q2
)(
1− x2(q1, q2)
)]
δV (q1, q
N
2 )
]}
+ P (NotRated)δVt+1(q1, q2) (1.8)
The objective function of RA1 is to maximize Vt(q1, q2), the strategy being x1. Note
that RA1’s strategy is only effectual when it rates a bad project. In all other cases,
RA1’s strategy is inconsequential.
Proposition 1. There exists a unique x1, where 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, given that Vt(q1, q2) is
an increasing function in q1.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1
Intuitively, it is easy to see from equation (1.8) that Vt(q1, q2) is linear in x1. This
ensures that RA1’s maximization problem has a unique solution.
Proposition 2. A strategic RA does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1
Proposition 2 implies that a strategic RA always gives GR to a good project. This
is because it gets a lower pay-off if it deviates from this strategy and gives a NR to a
good project. The proposition follows directly from the pay-off structure of the RAs
and the beliefs.
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Proposition 3. There exists a unique equilibrium as described in Definition 1.4.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
Corollary 1. Assume pG < 1. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is
always positive, i.e. it inflates ratings with positive probability.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1
Corollary 2. Suppose the model ends in period T. Then the equilibrium strategy of
the strategic RA is x = 1 at t = T − 1, T .
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1
We now present an analytical solution in a finite period setting. We solve the
model numerically in infinite horizon in Section 1.6.
1.5 Finite Horizon Solution
We assume the model lasts for three periods, t = 1, 2, 3, and the RAs maximize
their expected total income over the three periods. We compute the equilibrium
strategy of the RAs using backward induction. We already know that the strategic
RA will always lie in the last two periods, as shown in Corollary 2.
We solve for the equilibrium strategy at t = 1. Again, let’s look at the decision of
RA1. Since RA1 will always lie at t = 2, 3, the expected pay-off of RA1 at t = 1 is
Ψ(lie) = I + δV2(q
F
1 , q2) = I + δf(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1)I
+ δ2
{
f(qF1 , 1, q2, 1)[λpGf(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1) + ((1− pG)λ+ (1− λ))f(qFF1 , 1, q2, 1)]
+ f(q2, 1, q
F
1 , 1)[λpGf(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1) +
(
λ(1− pG) + (1− λ)(1− q2)
)
f(qF1 , 1, q
F
2 , 1)
+ (1− λ)q2f(qF1 , 1, qN2 , 1)]
}
I (1.9)
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if it lies, and
Ψ(honest) = δV2(q
N
1 , q2) = δf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)I
+ δ2
{
f(qN1 , 1, q2, 1)[λpGf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1) + ((1− pG)λ+ (1− λ))f(qNF1 , 1, q2, 1)]
+ f(q2, 1, q
N
1 , 1)[λpGf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1) +
(
λ(1− pG) + (1− λ)(1− q2)
)
f(qN1 , 1, q
F
2 , 1)
+ (1− λ)q2f(qN1 , 1, qN2 , 1)]
}
I (1.10)
if it is honest, where f(q1, x1, q2, x2) is the probability that the project comes to RA1
next period, given its reputation q1, its strategy x1, its competitor’s reputation q2 and
its competitor’s strategy x2.
As described in Section 1.4, we look for an equilibrium of the game by examining
the trade-off facing RA1, i.e. the difference between expressions (1.9) and (1.10). If
the pay-off from lying is greater then x1 = 1 and we have a pure-strategy equilibrium
in which RA1 always lies; if the pay-off from not lying is greater then x1 = 0 and
we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 never lies; otherwise we have a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 is indifferent between lying and not lying,
given some prior beliefs about its strategy, i.e. 0 < x1 < 1.
To derive an analytical solution to this game, we make a simplifying assumption
that pG = 1 and δ = 1. This assumption implies that the reputation of the strategic
RA goes to zero if it gives a GR to a bad project since now every good project succeeds
and every bad project fails. This simplifies expressions (1.9) and (1.10) and allows us
to derive the equilibrium strategy of RA1. This assumption is relaxed in Section 1.6.
The expression of market share of RA1 depends on whether RA1 has a higher
probability of success than its competitor. Given that the strategy of the strategic
RA in the last two periods is to always lie, the RA with a higher reputation will have
a higher market share in any single period. Hence we compute the strategy of RA1
in different ranges of the reputation of RA2.
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Proposition 4. The equilibrium strategy at t = 1 assuming pG = 1 and δ = 1 is
x1 =

0 if A ≤ λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
)
1− (1−2A)λq1
2A(1−q1) if
λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
) < A < 1
2
1 if A ≥ 1
2
where A is the solution to the equation
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = I − δ(2A−min{A,B})I − δ2
(
λ(2A−min{A,B})2+
(2B −min{A,B})[λ(2A−min{A,B}) + 2(1− λ)(1− q2)A+ (1− λ)q2A])I = 0
and B =
1
2
(
s(q2,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) .
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1
Corollary 3. In equilibrium, x1 is decreasing in q1. Moreover, x1 is increasing in q2
using first order Taylor approximation.
Proof. See Appendix 1.8.1
Proposition 4 implies that the strategy of RA1 depends on its own and its com-
petitor’s reputation. When A is large, RA1 always gives a GR to a bad project.
Conversely, when A is small RA1 behaves honestly and gives NR to bad projects. In
the intermediate range, RA1 has a mixed strategy, with 0 < x1 < 1. Note that the
lower threshold for A is increasing with RA1’s reputation.
The results imply that RA1 tends to lie less as its reputation increases (Corollary
3). The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Since we assumed pG = 1, the
reputation of RA1 goes to zero immediately after a project fails. This means that the
cost of lying increases with RA1’s reputation while the benefit of lying stays constant.
Hence it is not surprising that RA1 prefers to lie less as its reputation increases.15
15Our results in Section 1.6 show that this is no longer true if pG < 1. The penalty on reputation
will be smaller as the reputation of RA increases, i.e. the cost of ratings inflation can decrease with
reputation, resulting in a ‘u-shaped’ relationship between strategy and reputation.
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Moreover, according to Corollary 3, RA1’s strategy tends to increase with RA2’s
reputation. As explained before, competition has two opposite effects on the behavior
of RA1: the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. When the reputation of
its opponent increases, RA1 will find it less attractive to increase its own reputation
given a smaller expected future market share, and hence will behave more laxly. On
the other hand, RA1 may have incentives to behave honestly when RA2’s reputation
increases in order to maintain its market leader position. Our analysis shows that
the market-sharing effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect, using first order
Taylor approximation. One potential explanation could be that, in our model, the
market share of a rating agency is determined not only by its reputation relative to
that of its competitor, but also by the absolute level of its reputation. That is, even a
monopolistic RA cannot behave totally laxly, because otherwise its reputation would
become too low to credibly rate most projects. Therefore, the incentives of a RA
to maintain good reputation, even in absence of competition, render the disciplining
effect of competition weaker. We believe this is reasonable because in reality, given
rational investors, a monopolistic RA would not have unbounded market powers.
However, the results above are based on a three-period model with the assumption
that pG = 1, i.e. the strategic RA is caught immediately after the project fails. The
results may be driven by the fact that the RAs only live for three periods and hence
have limited potential gains associated with higher reputation. In order to capture
the long-term benefits of reputation under a more general setting, we move on to the
next section, where we relax parameter assumptions and compute numerical solutions
in an infinite-horizon case.
1.6 Infinite Horizon Solution
We now present the numerical solution of the model in infinite horizon. The
numerical solution is once again computed using backward induction, i.e. we first
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solve the model in the finite period case, and then increase the number of periods so
that the equilibrium strategy converges to the infinite horizon solution.
In an infinite period setting, Vt by itself is independent of t. Hence we suppress
the time subscript for notational simplicity. However, the reputations evolve over
time as investors (and issuers) update their beliefs. Let RA1 be the rating agency
that behaves strategically. Then, RA1’s value function takes the following form:
V (q1, q2) =
1
2
(
s1 − λpG
)
(1− λ)pG
{
λ
[
I + pGδV (q1, q2) + (1− pG)δV (qF1 , q2)
]
+
(1− λ)
[
x1(q1, q2)
(
I + δV (qF1 , q2)
)
+
(
1− x1(q1, q2)
)
δV (qN1 , q2)
]}
+
s2 − 12
(
s1 + λpG
)
(1− λ)pG
{
λ
[
pGδV (q1, q2) + (1− pG)δV (q1, qF2 )
]
+
(1− λ)
[
(1− q2)x2(q1, q2)δV (q1, qF2 ) +
[
q2 +
(
1− q2
)(
1− x2(q1, q2)
)]
δV (q1, q
N
2 )
]}
+
pG − s2
(1− λ)pG δV (q1, q2) (1.11)
where
1
2
(
s1−λpG
)
(1−λ)pG is the probability that the issuer approaches RA1 for rating,
s2− 12
(
s1+λpG
)
(1−λ)pG is the probability that the issuer approaches RA2 and
pG−s2
(1−λ)pG is the
probability that the project is not rated by either RA.
We assume that the model ends at period T and solve the model backwards.
We know that the strategic RA will always lie at period T and T − 1 according to
Corollary 2. For all t < T − 1, the strategy of the RA depends on its own and its
competitors’ reputation. We solve for the equilibrium strategy of the RA described in
Section 1.4. We look at the pay-offs from lying and being honest and determine the
strategy. As long as I + Vt(qF1 , q2) > Vt(qN1 , q2) for xt = 1, RA1 will always choose to
lie. Conversely, if I+Vt(qF1 , q2) < Vt(qN1 , q2) for xt = 0, RA1 will always tell the truth.
In all other intermediate cases, there exists a unique xt s.t. I+Vt(qF1 , q2) = Vt(qN1 , q2)
at which RA1 is indifferent between lying or not. Hence we deduce inductively the
equilibrium strategies of RA1. As T goes to infinity, we approach the infinite horizon
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solution. Since δ < 1, the Blackwell conditions are satisfied.
Using this procedure, we solve the model for various parameter values. At the first
instance, we solve the model for a monopolistic RA. Next, we introduce competition
in the form of RA2 and show that the additional competitive element is not sufficient
to discipline the RAs. Furthermore, our results show that competition will in fact
increase ratings inflation.
1.6.1 Monopolistic RA
First we consider the case where there is only one RA in the market. In order to
make RA1 a monopolist, we set the reputation of RA2 to 0.
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Figure 1.3: Strategy vs Reputation, Monopolistic RA (λ, pG, δ, q2) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 0)
Figure 1.3 plots the strategy of the monopolistic RA for parameters (λ, pG, δ) =
(0.5, 0.7, 0.9).16 We can clearly see the strategy of RA1 is ‘u-shaped’ in its reputation.
16Note that we have chosen this set of parameters (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9) for the purpose of
illustration only, and verified that our results are robust to other parameter specifications, the plot
of which are available upon request. In particular, robustness checks of the main results (Section
1.6.3) are presented in Appendix 1.8.2.
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Intuitively, the RA’s strategy is determined by the trade-off between current fees
and expected future income. When its reputation is very low, the RA’s expected
future income is very small compared to current fees, hence it has little incentive
to behave honestly. When its reputation increases, the RA’s future income becomes
larger while current fees stay the same, the RA tends to lie less. However, when
the RA’s reputation is very high, the penalty for lying decreases, and the RA starts
to lie more. The reason that the penalty for lying decreases with reputation is that
investors attribute project failures to bad luck rather than lax behavior when they
believe that the RA is very likely to be of the honest type.
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Figure 1.4: Strategy vs Reputation for different values of λ and pG (δ = 0.9)
Moreover, we can see from Figure 1.4 that the strategy of RA1 is increasing in
λ but decreasing in pG.17 The intuition is that, the reputational penalty of lying
depends on how the investors update their beliefs. If projects are more likely to be
good (higher λ) or if good projects are more likely to fail (lower pG), then a failure is
more likely to be attributed to bad luck rather than lying. Anticipating this smaller
cost of lying on reputation, the RA would choose to lie more when λ increases or pG
decreases.
17We have also verified that this result holds in the case of competitive RAs, the plots of which
are available upon request.
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1.6.2 Competitive RA
We now look at the impact of competition on the behavior of rating agencies by
introducing a second RA (RA2). Figure 1.5 plots the strategy of RA1 for parameter
values (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9). Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show cross-sections of this
figure, for different values of q2 and q1 respectively.
Figure 1.5: Strategy vs Reputation, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Figure 1.6 shows the relationship between the reputation and strategy of RA1 for
different values of the competing RA2’s reputation. As we can see, the relationship
between the reputation and strategy of RA1 remains ‘u-shaped’ as in the monopolistic
case. Moreover, as the reputation of RA2 increases, the reputation at which RA1 has
minimum x1, i.e. is least likely to lie, also increases. This is not surprising as the
disciplining effect is greatest when the reputation of the competing RA (RA2) is close
to the reputation of RA1. This is because when the RAs’ reputations are close, it
is more likely that the market leadership will change, resulting in more disciplined
behavior. Conversely, if the two RAs have very different reputations, the disciplining
36
effect is relatively weaker.
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Figure 1.6: Strategy vs Reputation, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9), different values of q2
Moreover, as Figure 1.7 shows, the strategy of RA1 is initially decreasing with
or flat in RA2’s reputation, and then increasing. This effect of competition is a
combination of the disciplining effect and the market-sharing effect. The disciplining
effect is strongest when the two RA’s reputations are close, and weakest when the
two RA’s reputations are far apart, which implies that the probability of a change of
market leader is very small. On the other hand, the market-sharing effect is always
increasing in the competing RA’s reputation. When the reputation of RA2 is low,
the market-sharing effect is very small as RA2 can only take away a tiny fraction
37
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Reputation of RA2 (q2)
St
ra
te
gy
 o
f R
A1
 (x
1)
(a) q1=0.25
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Reputation of RA2 (q2)
St
ra
te
gy
 o
f R
A1
 (x
1)
(b) q1=0.45
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Reputation of RA2 (q2)
St
ra
te
gy
 o
f R
A1
 (x
1)
(c) q1=0.55
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Reputation of RA2 (q2)
St
ra
te
gy
 o
f R
A1
 (x
1)
(d) q1=0.75
Figure 1.7: Strategy vs Reputation, different values of q1, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
of market share. As RA2’s reputation starts to increase, RA1 tends to lie less as
the disciplining effect dominates the market-sharing effect. However, when RA2’s
reputation goes beyond a certain level, the market-sharing effect dominates as RA2’s
reputation becomes much higher than RA1’s. Hence RA1 will lie more for high values
of RA2’s reputation, due to the dominance of the market-sharing effect.
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show the expected profits of RA1 as a function of RA1 and
RA2’s reputation. We can clearly see that the expected profits of RA1 are increasing
in its own reputation, and decreasing in its competitor’s reputation, illustrating the
market-sharing effect.
Finally, Figure 1.10 shows the convergence dynamics. It plots the change in RA1’s
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Figure 1.8: Expected Profits vs Reputation, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
strategy as the number of periods remaining increases. Reputation becomes less and
less important as the number of periods remaining declines since there are fewer pe-
riods to reap the benefits of higher reputation. Thus ratings inflation increases. Note
that as the number of periods remaining increases, the strategy converges, implying
that we approach a long (infinite) horizon equilibrium.
In summary, our results show that introducing competition in the form of a second
RA is not sufficient to discipline the RAs which always lie with positive probability
in equilibrium. We now show that competition will actually increase the lax behavior
of RAs and reduce expected welfare.
1.6.3 Comparing Monopolistic and Competitive RA
It is often suggested that introducing more competition in the ratings industry
can alleviate the problem of improper incentives and ratings inflation. However, our
results show that competition is likely to worsen this situation and lead to more
ratings inflation.
Figure 1.11 compares the strategic behavior of RA1 under no competition, i.e.
monopolistic RA (q2 = 0), and under a competitive setting with different values of
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Figure 1.9: Expected Profits vs Reputation, different values of q1 and q2, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
q2. We observe that in most cases, RA1 is prone to greater ratings inflation relative
to the monopolistic RA.
As described before, the implication of competition can be divided into the market-
sharing effect and the disciplining effect. We can see that the market-sharing effect
dominates the disciplining effect (i.e. competition aggravates lax behavior) in most
cases. The only case where competition may actually alleviate the lax behavior of RA1
is when q2 is very low (as shown in Figure 1.11(a)). This is because the market-sharing
effect is weakest relative to the disciplining effect for low values of q2. Intuitively,
the disciplining effect only depends on the difference between q1 and q2, whereas the
market-sharing effect increases with the absolute level of q2. Hence the market-sharing
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Figure 1.10: Convergence Dynamics of RA1
effect tends to dominate the disciplining effect except for low values of q2.
In order to assess the overall impact of competition, we compute the expected
increase in lax behavior of RA1 given its own reputation, assuming that the reputation
of RA2 is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. A positive value of this measure means the
overall effect of enhanced competition on RA1 is to lie more (i.e inflate ratings more).
Excess Lax behavior of RA1 =
∫
q2∈[0,1]
x1(q1, q2) dq2 − x1(q1, 0) (1.12)
As shown in Figure 1.12, the expected increase in lax behavior of RA1 is always
positive, indicating that competition will, in general, aggravate ratings inflation. This
is because a smaller market share will tend to reduce the reputational concerns of
the RAs, and this market-sharing effect outweighs the disciplining effect brought by
competition. Moreover, we can see that the expected increase in lax behavior is
increasing for low values of RA1’s own reputation and decreasing for high values of
RA1’s reputation. The intuition is that, when the reputation of RA1 is low, the
market share of RA1 is going to shrink significantly after introducing RA2 and the
market-sharing effect of competition is strongest. However, when the reputation of
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Figure 1.11: Comparing Monopolistic and Competitive RA, (λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
Solid line represents monopolistic RA while dashed line represents competitive RA with different values
of q2
RA1 is high, the impact of introducing RA2 on RA1’s market share is small, hence
the market-sharing effect becomes weaker and RA1 will lie relatively less. We verify
that the excess lax behavior, as defined above, is always positive for other values of
λ and pG in Appendix 1.8.2.
In addition, we measure the expected total welfare in both monopolistic and
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Figure 1.12: Excess Lax Behavior of RA1 due to Competition, (λ, pG, δ)=(0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
duopolistic settings as defined below.
Expected Total Welfare = E(Project Payoff)− E(Financing Cost)
= P (RA1 rates)
(
λpGΦ− E(X)
(
λ+ (1− λ)(1− q1)x1
))
+ P (RA2 rates)
(
λpGΦ− E(X)
(
λ+ (1− λ)(1− q2)x2
))
Figure 1.13 compares the total welfare18 between the monopolistic case and the
duopolistic case where both RAs have the same reputation. We can see that if a
new RA is introduced with the same reputation as the incumbent RA, then the total
welfare will always decrease, due to the fact that both RAs are more likely to inflate
ratings.
Moreover, when we compare in Figure 1.14, the expected total welfare between the
monopolistic case and the duopolistic case with fixed values of reputations of RA2,
we can see that introducing competition will always lead to lower total welfare as long
as the reputation of RA2 is lower than the reputation of RA1. However, total welfare
18We are computing the welfare in one period only because it does not depend on time.
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Figure 1.13: Expected Welfare - Competitor has same Reputation
Solid line represents monopoly while dashed line represents duopoly with q1 = q2
may increase if the entrant RA has a higher reputation than the incumbent. Overall,
this implies that competition is likely to adversely impact total welfare, unless we can
introduce a new RA with much higher reputation than the incumbent. We check the
robustness of this result for different values of λ and pG in Appendix 1.8.2.
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Figure 1.14: Expected Welfare - Competitor has different Reputation
Solid line represents monopoly while dashed line represents duopoly for different values of q2
(λ, pG, δ) = (0.5, 0.7, 0.9)
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we show that competition can amplify ratings inflation and the lax
behavior of rating agencies, reducing total welfare. This result has important policy
implications since it suggests that the most often cited solution to ratings inflation -
enhanced competition in the ratings industry - is likely to render the situation worse.
While we acknowledge that in order to focus on the implications of competition in the
credit ratings industry, we have abstracted from other important issues such as herd
behavior, multiple ratings, and the quality of the models used by rating agencies, we
believe that our results can serve as a baseline for evaluating the reform proposals
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currently being discussed.
One of the key thrusts of recent regulatory action in the credit ratings space has
been to relax barriers to entry and enhance competition. In the US, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has relaxed some barriers to entry and allowed several new
CRAs in the US to obtain the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization
(NRSRO) status. The European Union (EU) has gone further and has introduced
new requirements as part of the proposed amendments to the EU Regulation on credit
rating agencies, the so called ‘CRA-III’. The new legislation seeks to place a cap on
the market share of each ratings agency and requires issuers to rotate credit rating
agencies periodically (see Commission (2011) for details).
In the context of our model, the cap on the market share of rating agencies is
likely to incentivize RAs to inflate ratings when their market share is close to the cap
since they would no longer benefit from higher reputation. Furthermore, proposals to
rotate RAs would mean that RAs would be assured of a market share, irrespective of
their reputation. This would break the link between reputation and future income,
thereby increasing ratings inflation. More broadly, proposals aimed at artificially
enhancing competition are likely to exacerbate the market sharing effect, while doing
little to increase the discipling effect.
One of the key findings in our model is that unless the new entrant RA has a higher
reputation than the incumbent, increased competition is likely to adversely impact
total welfare. However, it is unlikely that a new entrant would have sufficiently high
reputation (and hence market share) to challenge the incumbents. It is more plausible
to believe that the new entrants would start off as marginal players. Moreover, it is
likely that under the current issuer pay model, they will continue to remain marginal
players as their low reputation (and associated market share) would incentivize them
to inflate ratings more than the established RAs. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence
suggests that ratings issued by Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS), a relatively
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new player in the European market, are significantly more lenient than those issued
by the more established players.
In conjunction with related work on multiple ratings and herd behavior in the
credit ratings industry, our results suggest that a fundamental reorganization of the
industry may be required to align the incentives. The conflict of interest highlighted
in our paper is fundamental to the issuer-pay model and any meaningful attempt
to resolve the conflict would require a fundamental shift in the way rating agencies
are compensated. Empirical work by Xia and Strobl (2012) suggests that investor
paid RAs can be a solution as they are unlikely to be affected by the conflict of
interest highlighted in this paper and can have a discipling effect on the incumbent
RAs. However, while an investor pay RAs can be a solution, free riding on the part
of investors could result in insufficient revenues for such RAs, making it difficult for
them to compete with the incumbents. Deb and Murphy (2009) argue that although
free riding is a problem, the increasing use of ratings by institutions, coupled with
the rise in the speed of information diffusion in the markets over the last few decades
could, with proper regulatory encouragement, ensure that there are investors willing
to subscribe to ratings issued by investor pay RAs.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
There exists a unique x1, where 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1, given that Vt(q1, q2) is an increasing
function in q1.
Proof. When the strategic RA (RA1) gets a bad project, it will get pay-off Ψ(lie) =
I + δVt(q
F
1 , q2) if it gives the project a GR, and Ψ(honest) = δVt(qN1 , q2) if it refuses
rating. Note that qF1 =
λ(1−pG)qt
λ(1−pG)+(1−λ)(1−q1)x1 and q
N
1 =
qt
1−x1(1−qt) , i.e. q
F
1 is decreasing
in x1 and qN1 is increasing in x1. Given that Vt(q1, q2) is increasing in q1, it is easy to
see that Ψ(lie) is decreasing in x1 and that Ψ(honest) is increasing in x1. Thus if we
define x1 such that
• x1 = 1 if Ψ(lie) ≥ Ψ(honest)
• x1 = 0 if Ψ(lie) ≤ Ψ(honest) for
• x1 = x∗1 such that 0 < x∗1 < 1 if Ψ(lie) = Ψ(honest)
it follows that x1 is well-defined and unique.
Proof of Proposition 2
The strategic RA does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof. Suppose that the strategic RA (RA1) gets a good project and that its strategy
is x1. Let’s examine whether RA1 wants to deviate:
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• if x1 = 1, we have Ψ(lie) ≥ Ψ(honest), or I + δVt(qF1 , q2) ≥ δVt(qN1 , q2). If the
RA1 gives NR to the good project, it will get δVt(qN1 , q2), and I+pGδVt(q1, q2)+
(1 − pG)δVt(qF1 , q2) otherwise. Since I + pGδVt(q1, q2) + (1 − pG)δVt(qF1 , q2) ≥
I + δVt(q
F
1 , q2) ≥ δVt(qN1 , q2), RA1 does not want to deviate.
• if x1 = 0, qN1 = qF1 = q1, hence reputation becomes irrelevant and the RA does
not have an incentive to give NR to the good project.
• if 0 < x1 < 1, we have Ψ(lie) = Ψ(honest), so I + pGδVt(q1, q2) + (1 −
pG)δVt(q
F
1 , q2) ≥ I + δVt(qF1 , q2) = δVt(qN1 , q2), and hence RA1 does not want to
deviate.
Therefore RA1 does not have incentives to give NR to a good project.
Proof of Corollary 1
Assume pG < 1. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic RA is always
positive.
Proof. Suppose that the equilibrium strategy is x1 = 0. Then qN1 = qF1 = q1 and we
must have I + δVt(q1, q2) ≤ δVt(q1, q2). This is impossible as long as I > 0. Hence
x1 = 0 cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose the model ends in period T. Then the equilibrium strategy of the strategic
RA is xt = 1 at t = T − 1, T .
Proof. At t = T , the strategic RA does not have any reputational concerns. This
implies that the strategy of strategic RA will be to always give GR if the project is
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bad, i.e. xT = 1.
Similarly, at t = T−1 the strategic RA will always lie. Suppose that a bad project
comes to strategic RA, say RA1. The expected pay-off of RA1 is
I + δVT−1(qF1 , q2) = I + f(q
F
1 , 1, q2, 1)δI (1.13)
if it lies, i.e. gives a good rating, and
δVT−1(qN1 , q2) = f(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)δI (1.14)
if it does not lie, i.e. gives no rating, where f(q1, x1, q2, x2) is the probability that
the project comes to RA1 in the next period. Using equations (1.5), (1.6) and (1.7)
we have
• f(q1, x1, q2, x2) =
1
2
(
s(q1,x1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) if s(q1, x1) ≤ s(q2, x2)
• f(q1, x1, q2, x2) = s(q1,x1)−
1
2
(
s(q2,x2)+λpG
)
pG(1−λ) otherwise
where s(q, x) = λpG
λ+(1−q)(1−λ)x .
Although in this case RA1 does have reputational concerns, these are not sufficient
to prevent RA1 from being lax and not giving GR to bad projects. Since by being
honest RA1 is giving up I today, in exchange for having a higher chance of getting I
in the next period, it is not optimal for RA1 to be honest, given that RA1 is impatient
(i.e. δ < 1). Hence the optimal strategy of RA1 is to always lie, i.e. xT−1 = 1.
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Proof of Proposition 4
The equilibrium strategy at t = 1 assuming pG = 1 and δ = 1 is
x1 =

0 if A ≤ λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
)
1− (1−2A)λq1
2A(1−q1) if
λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
) < A < 1
2
1 if A ≥ 1
2
where A is the solution to the equation
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = I − δ(2A−min{A,B})I − δ2
(
λ(2A−min{A,B})2+
(2B −min{A,B})[λ(2A−min{A,B}) + 2(1− λ)(1− q2)A+ (1− λ)q2A])I = 0
and B =
1
2
(
s(q2,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) .
In addition, x1 is decreasing in q1. Moreover, x1 is increasing in q2 using first
order Taylor approximation.
Proof. Since pG = 1, the reputation of RA1 (i.e. the strategic RA) will go to zero
if it gives a GR to a bad project since now every good project succeeds and every
bad project fails. So the expected pay-off from giving a GR to a bad project is I.
This simplifies expressions (1.9) and (1.10) and allows us to derive RA1’s equilibrium
strategy.
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The expected pay-off from being honest is
Ψ(honest) = δf(qN1 , 1, q2, 1)I + δ
2
(
f(qN1 , 1, q2, 1)λf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)
+f(q2, 1, q
N
1 , 1)[λf(q
N
1 , 1, q2, 1)+(1−λ)(1−q2)f(qN1 , 1, qF2 , 1)+(1−λ)q2f(qN1 , 1, qN2 , 1)]
)
I
Using equations (1.6) and (1.7) and noting that RA1 will always lie in periods t = 2, 3,
this can be rewritten as
Ψ(honest) = δ(2A−min{A,B})I + δ2
(
λ(2A−min{A,B})2
+ (2B −min{A,B})[λ(2A−min{A,B}) + 2(1− λ)(1− q2)A+ (1− λ)q2A]
)
I
where A =
1
2
(
s(qN1 ,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) and B =
1
2
(
s(q2,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ)
The expected pay-off from lying is I, since the RA’s reputation goes to zero
Ψ(lie) = I
We look for a equilibrium of the game by examining RA1’s trade-off between lying
and not lying. If the pay-off from lying is greater when x1 = 1, we have a pure-
strategy equilibrium in which RA1 always lies; if the pay-off from not lying is greater
when x1 = 0, we have a pure-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 never lies; otherwise
we have a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which RA1 is indifferent between lying or
not given some prior beliefs about its strategy, i.e. 0 < x1 < 1.
We now solve the equation Ψ(lie) − Ψ(honest) = 0. We do this in 2 stages. In
the first stage, we solve the equation in terms of A and then using the expression for
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A, we solve for the equilibrium value of x1.
For A < B we have
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = δ2(1− λ)(2− q2)A2 −
(
δ + 2Bδ2λ+ 2Bδ2(1− λ)(2− q2)
)
A+ 1
Assuming δ = 1, the solution is
A = B +
1 + 2Bλ−√(1 + 2Bλ)2 + (1− λ)(2− q2)%
2(1− λ)(2− q2)
which is valid19 as long as % = B2
(
2− (1− λ)q2
)
+B − 1 > 0.
Note that B can be simplified to
B =
λq2
2
(
1− q2(1− λ)
)
We can see that B is bounded above by 1
2
. Therefore % ≤ 0 and we can rule out the
case above.
Now for A ≥ B we have
Ψ(lie)−Ψ(honest) = −4δ2λA2 − (2δ − 2Bδ2λ+Bδ2(1− λ)(2− q2))A+ δB + 1
Assuming δ = 1, the solution is
A = B +
√(
2 + 6λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2)
)2 − 16λ%− (2 + 6λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2))
8λ
19i.e. A is real and less than B.
53
which is valid20 given % = B2
(
2− (1− λ)q2
)
+B − 1 ≤ 0.
Note that A can also be expressed as
A =
√(
2− 2λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2)
)2
+ 16λ(B + 1)− (2− 2λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2))
8λ
Applying first-order Taylor approximation21, we have
A ' B + 1
2− 2λB +B(1− λ)(2− q2) =
B + 1
2− 2λB + λq2
2
+B(1− 2λ)
Substituting for B, the first order derivative of A with respect to q2 is
λ
(
(1− λ)(3λ− 2)q22 + 4(1− λ)q2 + 8λ
)
(
4− q2(4λ2 − 6λ+ 4)− λ(1− λ)q22
)2
It can be shown that the minimum of the above is proportional to −4(1−λ)
3λ−2 + 8λ
and is attained when q2 = − 23λ−2 . When λ < 23 , the minimum is always positive,
hence A is increasing in q2. When λ > 23 , the derivative reaches zero when q2 =
−4(1−λ)±
√(
16(1−λ)2−32λ(1−λ)(3λ−2)
2(1−λ)(3λ−2) , which is negative. Hence the minimum is positive
for q2 > 0. Therefore A is always increasing in q2.
Now we have shown that there always exists a solution which depends on the
parameter %. Since A always has a solution, we can use it to find the equilibrium
strategy x1 in terms of A, i.e. we will look for the value of x1 such that
1
2
(
s(qN1 ,1)−λpG
)
pG(1−λ) =
A.
Note that assuming pG = 1 implies λpG = λ. Using this and equation (1.5), the
20i.e. A is real and greater than B.
21That is,
√
N2 + d ' N + d2N .
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above expression can be rewritten as λq
N
1
λqN1 +1−qN1
= 2A, where qN1 =
q1
1−(1−q1)x1 .
Solving, we obtain
x1 = 1− (1− 2A)λq1
2A(1− q1)
for 0 < x1 < 1. This holds when λq1
2
(
λq1+(1−q1)
) < A < 1
2
. Clearly, we have x1 increasing
in A and decreasing in q1.
1.8.2 Robustness Check
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Figure 1.15: Excess Lax behavior for different values of λ and pG (δ = 0.9)
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Figure 1.16: Excess Lax behavior for different values of λ and pG (continued)
56
Expected Total Welfare
The reputation of RA1 (q1) above which the expected total welfare is always greater in the monopoly
case than in the duopoly case, for different values of q2 (δ = 0.9)
Parameter values q2 = 0.25 q2 = 0.45 q2 = 0.55 q2 = 0.75
λ = 0.5, pG = 0.5 q1 = 0.23 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.52 q1 = 0.69
λ = 0.5, pG = 0.7 q1 = 0.23 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.52 q1 = 0.69
λ = 0.5, pG = 0.9 q1 = 0.23 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.52 q1 = 0.69
λ = 0.7, pG = 0.5 q1 = 0.15 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.67
λ = 0.7, pG = 0.7 q1 = 0.15 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.67
λ = 0.7, pG = 0.9 q1 = 0.15 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.67
λ = 0.9, pG = 0.5 q1 = 0.13 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.66
λ = 0.9, pG = 0.7 q1 = 0.13 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.66
λ = 0.9, pG = 0.9 q1 = 0.13 q1 = 0.45 q1 = 0.51 q1 = 0.66
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Chapter 2
The Effects of Fund Flows on
Corporate Investment: a Catering
View
2.1 Introduction
Stock prices are positively related to corporate investment. Firms with strong
fundamentals are associated with higher stock prices and higher investment, but is
the non-fundamental component of stock prices related to corporate investment? In
other words, when stock prices depart from fundamentals, are there any real effects?
In particular, is there any relation between high stock prices and the execution of
value-destroying projects for firms that are not financially constrained? This chapter
provides evidence that uninformative stock demand exerted by extreme mutual fund
flows prompts firm managers to overinvest.
In principle, firm managers maximize the long-term value of the firm’s assets and
only execute positive net present-value projects. However, Stein (1996) shows that
firm managers with incentives to maximize the current stock price might execute
value-destroying projects. To illustrate this mechanism, consider a software firm
with very little or no debt and plentiful internal funds. In recent years, the firm
has delivered a series of very successful products; however, lately, its active research
and development (R&D) department has failed to offer any suitable projects, an issue
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acknowledged by the firm manager. Mutual funds with an important stake in the firm
have been investing and collecting high returns in recent years, and retail investors1
have been moving money into mutual funds that hold the firm’s stock. The firm
manager knows that the company’s mutual fund shareholders believe that the firm’s
prospects are better than they actually are, and she must decide whether to invest in
value-destroying projects. She knows that the firm’s shareholders have a short-term
horizon and will sell their stakes before any information about the quality of the
project becomes public, a process that takes particularly long in a software firm with
opaque assets. If the firm manager invests, the stock price will rise temporarily, and
before the price reverts, the firm’s shareholders will have cashed in on the artificial
rise in prices. By contrast, however, if the manager maximizes the long-term value
of the firm, she will not invest in value-destroying projects, and the stock price will
not move. Therefore, if her objective is to maximize the current share price, she will
cater to shareholders’ expectations by investing. The main focus of this chapter is
the empirical question of whether uninformative mutual fund flows lead managers of
non-financially constrained firms to overinvest.
In this chapter, I use Coval and Stafford (2007)’s mutual fund flow-related variable
to measure stock price pressure. Firms whose stocks are bought by funds under
extreme inflows are high price pressure firms and have lower expected future stock
returns. The price pressure measure is particularly suited for testing the catering
channel of investment for the following reasons: (i) price pressure is beyond the
firm manager’s control; that is, she is unlikely to have any influence on the portfolio
allocation of the mutual funds that invest in her firm; (ii) the reversal pattern in stock
returns associated with price pressure takes longer than 2 years, a period long enough
to influence the investment decision by the firm manager; (iii) price pressure contains
the two ingredients of a stock mispricing variable, i.e., a pattern that consistently
1Retail investors are those who invest in and have quotas in mutual funds.
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drives stock prices away from fundamentals and a certain degree of limits to arbitrage
that impede arbitrageurs from stepping in and driving prices back to fundamentals2.
To empirically study the firm manager’s investment decision when faced with stock
price pressure, I implement tests that unveil an investment pattern that is not neces-
sarily driven only by the firm’s financing needs. After establishing that lagged price
pressure is positively correlated with investment, I show that: (i) high price pressure
high investment firms have lower future performance, which is consistent with firm
managers executing value-destroying projects; (ii) the investment sensitivity to price
pressure remains positive and significant for firms that are less financially constrained;
(iii) firms with short term shareholders have a stronger investment sensitivity to price
pressure. I describe the results below.
First, I test and show that lagged price pressure is associated with higher firm
investment, suggesting that a proxy for the non-fundamental component of stock
prices influences the firm’s investment policy. Although the price pressure variable
is quite exogenous to the fundamentals of the firm, the result is partially driven
by investment opportunities, a finding that is cause for concern. To address this
concern, I control for the following items: (i) Tobin’s Q, which many studies use as a
proxy for a firm’s fundamentals; (ii) cash flow, an important determinant of a firm’s
investment; and (iii) past stock returns, which capture the information component of
the price pressure variable. Even after implementing these controls, the investment
to price pressure sensitivity remains positive, significant and economically important.
Specifically, I find that the main regressor coefficient of lagged price pressure is 5.285
(t=4.17) in the specification without past stock returns and 3.680 (t=2.79) when
2The mutual fund industry is particularly prone to performance-based arbitrage à la Shleifer
and Vishny (1997). By moving flows into mutual funds with recent superior past performance -
the smart money effect - retail investors create price pressure on the stocks held by those mutual
funds, driving them away from fundamentals, as studied by Vayanos and Woolley (2011) and Lou
(2010). The latter author also shows that predictable demand shocks to individual stocks are not
fully eliminated by arbitrageurs, which is consistent with the limits of arbitrage in this setting.
60
including past stock returns from 60 months to 1 month before the beginning of the
investment period. These results are also economically relevant. In the specification
with past stock return controls, one standard deviation increase in the lagged price
pressure variable leads to an increase of 1.27% of investment as a proportion of lagged
capital, which is equivalent to 1.59% standard deviations and to 5.78% of the median
of the same investment variable.
Second, I examine whether high price pressure firms adopt value-destroying projects.
I run Fama and MacBeth (1973)’s regressions on future stock returns from 6 to 18
months after the end of the investment period as a dependent variable, finding that
the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the price pressure and investment
is negative and significant, consistent with high price pressure high investment firms
having lower future stock returns. One interpretation of this result is that high price
pressure firms that invest too much are executing more value-destroying projects than
other high price pressure firms that invest relatively less. Additionally, I use opera-
tional performance as a dependent variable, proxied by the future change in return
on assets, which leads to a similar result.
Third, I study a subset of firms that do not depend on external financing and
investigate whether their investment policies respond to stock price pressure. I split
the sample into relatively financially constrained and unconstrained firm-years ac-
cording to two indices of financial constraints: the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) KZ
index and the Hadlock and Pierce (2010) SA index. In both cases, I find that invest-
ment sensitivity to price pressure is positive and significant for the two subsamples of
firms and higher for the relatively financially unconstrained firms. I also examine the
investment policies of financially unconstrained firms using a subsample of firms that
do not conduct seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) from 1 year before the start of the
investment period until the end of the period. The results of this examination show
that the estimated coefficient for the investment sensitivity to price pressure remains
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positive and significant. In addition, I include cash from equity issuance as a control
in all tests implemented in this study and find that the results are largely robust.
The overall findings reveal that investment is sensitive to lagged stock price pressure
for less financially constrained firms and firms that are not engaging in SEOs. These
results seem to suggest that there is an operating catering channel of investment for
firms that do not rely on issuing external securities.
Finally, I test whether investment sensitivity to stock price pressure is stronger
when the firm manager has incentives to maximize the current stock price. In par-
ticular, firms with short-term shareholders and opaque assets tend to be responsive
to steeper short-term incentives. I observe short-term shareholders and long-term
shareholders, classifying the groups using a mutual fund churn rate measure. Stocks
that are held by higher-churning funds are held by short-term shareholders. I split
the sample into two groups, high and low churn rate firm-years. I find that invest-
ment sensitivity to price pressure is stronger for high churn rate firms, i.e., firms
with short-term shareholders. Along the same lines, I divide the sample into opaque
and non-opaque firms. The sample is split into firm-years with high and low R&D
intensity. Firms with high R&D expenses as a proportion of total assets reportedly
have a less transparent investment process and are harder to value, contributing to a
stronger catering mechanism. Indeed, regression estimates for the high R&D inten-
sity subsample are higher when measuring the investment sensitivity to price pressure.
These results are consistent with a stronger direct link between stock price pressure
and investment when a firm manager has incentives to maximize the current share
price.
The chapter continues as follows. In the next section, I relate this chapter to other
studies in the literature. In Section 2.3, I present the theoretical basis for the catering
mechanism and explain how it translates into testable empirical hypotheses. In Sec-
tion 2.4, I describe the mutual fund and accounting datasets, their merging procedure
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and the screening devices I use before forming the final dataset at the firm-year level.
I also define stock price pressure and describe its association with a reversal pattern.
Section 2.5 describes the empirical strategy and reports the results. In Section 2.6,
I show that the results hold true amid concerns regarding error measurements and,
additionally, that the results are robust when considering different definitions of the
price pressure variable. Section 2.7 presents the study’s conclusions.
2.2 Related Research
This chapter’s findings complement the literature on the real effects of equity
mispricing. This study is mostly related to the work of Polk and Sapienza (2009),
who provide evidence of an operating catering channel of investment by showing that
discretionary accruals are positively related to abnormal investment. I build on their
study by examining how extreme flows into funds that own a stake in the firm shape
firm managers’ investment policy. My test has an important innovation, in that while
they use discretionary accruals as a proxy for equity mispricing, which is set by firm
managers, I use mutual fund flow-driven equity mispricing, which is exogenous to
firm managers’ decision sets.
Another related study by Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) shows that firm in-
vestment is positively related to Tobin’s Q and that the sensibility monotonically
increases with the degree of financial constraints, as measured by the KZ index.
In their findings, stock mispricing proxied by Tobin’s Q influences firm investment
through external financing; the financial constraint is relaxed, and the firm is able to
issue external securities to finance positive net present value projects that previously
lacked funding. In contrast, the catering channel documented in the present chapter
is related to financially unconstrained firms that invest in negative net present value
projects when the firm manager has incentives to maximize the current stock price
and shareholders expect the firm to have better prospects than it actually has. Stock
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mispricing has a direct influence on firm investment, in opposition to the indirect
market timing channel, as documented by the three authors.
This chapter adds to the literature testing whether stock prices have an effect on
firm investment over and above fundamentals. In addition to Stein (1996), studies
that provide theoretical support on the effects of stock prices on investment include
Farhi and Panageas (2004) and Gilchrist, Himmelberg and Huberman (2005). On the
empirical side, earlier studies tended to regress firm investment using stock price and
a measure of firm fundamentals such as Tobin’s Q. When explaining firm investment,
Barro (1990) finds that the stock price outperformed Q, whereas Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny (1990) suggest instead that stock markets are a sideshow and do not influence
firm managers’ decisions to invest over and above fundamentals. The approach used
in the present chapter is more closely related to recent studies on the real effects
of stock mispricing; these studies examine the effects of a direct measure of stock
mispricing on firm investment.
This study is also linked to other papers that investigate firm managers’ catering
decisions, which are any corporate actions intended to boost share prices. Baker
and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Lie (2006) study the effects of catering on dividends.
Cooper (2001) and Cooper, Khorana, Osobov, Patel and Rau (2005) find evidence
that firms that changed to more “Internet-sounding” names during the dotcom bubble
increased their value. Aghion and Stein (2008) investigate whether catering incentives
influence firm managers’ decisions on how to maximize growth or cut costs.
Another strand of research studies how stock prices influence firm investment
through learning. This research argues that firm managers learn from stock prices
and base their investment decisions on them. Chen, Goldstein and Jiang (2007) test
this theory, finding that the amount of private information incorporated into stock
prices has a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of firm investment to stock prices.
In contrast, the present chapter studies a set of firm managers with short-horizon
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incentives in financially unconstrained firms; hence, these managers are unlikely to
learn from prices. In other words, the set of firms that is prone to catering is quite
uncorrelated with the set of firms whose managers learn from prices.
This study relates to other research that uses equity mutual fund flows as an
instrument to identify stock price pressure, including studies by Coval and Stafford
(2007); Frazzini and Lamont (2008); Lou (2010), Khan, Kogan and Serafeim (2012);
Hau and Lai (2011); Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2012); and Sulaeman and Wei
(2012). Recent studies finding that stock misvaluation leads to an increase in firm
investment include those by Gao and Lou (2011), Hau and Lai (2012) and Birru
(2012), although these studies identify a channel that relies on external financing and
focus on different strategies that do not exploit the catering channel of investment.
In contrast, Bakke and Whited (2010)’s study suggests that firm investment is not
influenced by stock mispricing.
2.3 Mechanism
The mechanism in this study is inspired by the Polk and Sapienza (2002)’s model
of catering of investment, which predicts that firm managers overinvest (underinvest)
if the stock is overpriced (underpriced).
Two types of agents include firm managers and mutual fund shareholders, both
which are risk-neutral. The firm manager maximizes the wealth of the average share-
holder. There is one project in which the firm manager might or might not invest.
The quality of the project is good or bad, but only the firm manager sees the quality
before the investment decision is made. The discovery process regarding the qual-
ity of the project depends on the opaqueness of the firm’s assets. In more opaque
firms, it takes longer for shareholders to find out whether the project is good or bad.
Shareholders derive all of their wealth from the sale of their stocks. They experience
one stochastic liquidity shock that prompts them to sell all their holdings in the firm.
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Mutual fund shareholders are bound to act as their retail investors lead them; when
there are extreme outflows, shareholders must sell their existing stock positions to
meet their redemptions. When there are extreme inflows, mutual fund shareholders
increase their existing stock positions.3
A good project enhances value, whereas a bad project destroys value. Hence, the
efficient decision is to invest only if the project is good. However, if shareholders have
early liquidity shocks, the manager might make inefficient decisions to maximize the
wealth of the average shareholder. The intuition is as follows. Consider the case of
an opaque firm, for which it takes shareholders longer to find out whether a project
is good or bad. Also assume that shareholders have, on average, short-term liquidity
needs, in the sense that most of them are likely to sell their stocks before knowing
the quality of a project. Furthermore, suppose that mutual fund shareholders under
extreme inflows own some of the firm’s stock, which becomes considerably overpriced.
Retail investors who invest in the mutual funds holding the firm’s stocks do not
know the quality of the project currently being invested in by the firm; however, the
investors assume the quality is good because the firm has been delivering consistently
good projects in recent years. If the manager believes the project is good, he makes
the efficient decision and invests. However, if the project is bad, to maximize the
wealth of the average shareholder, the manager should make an inefficient decision
and invest; this decision will lead to an increase in the stock price because retail
investors will believe that a value-enhancing project is being put into place. The
manager knows that once the quality of the project is revealed, the stock price will
fall; however, because the mutual fund shareholders have had early enough liquidity
shocks, the early increase in the stock price more than compensates for its subsequent
3Jotikasthira, Lundblad and Ramadorai (2012) argue that cash holdings do not seem to be
an important determinant of portfolio allocations of funds subject to funding shocks. Coval and
Stafford (2007) document that although funds experiencing extreme inflows hold more cash as funds
are evaluated against all-equity benchmarks, few of them maintain significant cash balances.
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decline.
The same mechanism works for managers with a good project opportunity subject
to considerable underpricing. Because shareholders are pessimistic as a result of the
lack of good projects and the lack of high returns in recent years, they believe that
current projects will remain bad and therefore interpret the investment decision by
the manager as a value-destroying one. The manager always decides not to invest
and forgoes good investment opportunities.4
In the mechanism described above, at least four characteristics should be in place.
First, the firm’s assets should be opaque enough that the quality of the project does
not become public too early. Second, mutual fund shareholders should have short-
term liquidity needs so that they will sell their stocks before the quality of the project
is revealed. Third, mutual fund shareholders under extreme flows should expand or
reduce their current holdings in accordance with the flows from retail investors.
The catering mechanism described above can be empirically tested as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Corporate investment increases with stock mis-
pricing driven by mutual fund extreme flows
The firm manager recognizes the price pressure coming from the mutual
fund shareholders and invests according to the direction of retail investors’
flows, especially if the flows are extreme.
The catering channel reflects inefficient decisions by the firm manager, i.e., a
manager who executes value-destroying projects when the stock price pressure is high.
Firms that make inefficient decisions should subsequently underperform, leading to
the following additional empirical prediction:
4This chapter will focus on the overpricing/overinvestment rather than on the underpric-
ing/underinvestment hypothesis test. The execution of a negative NPV project (which destroys
value) by a firm that is overpriced and overinvests can be associated to lower stock returns. The
lack of execution of a positive NPV project by a firm that is underpriced and underinvests does not
necessarily lead to lower stock returns as the project can still be executed at a later moment.
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Hypothesis 2: High price pressure firms that invest relatively
much should subsequently underperform.
Firms with high lagged price pressure and high investment should have
lower future returns and lower future operational performance. In par-
ticular, if we compare two firms with high price pressure, the firm that
invests relatively more has lower future returns and lower future opera-
tional performance.
Hypothesis 1 contends that corporate investment increases with stock mispric-
ing driven by mutual funds. This prediction might be consistent not only with the
catering channel described above but also with alternative explanations that rely on
external finance, such as the market timing channel explained by Baker et al. (2003).
Firm managers of correctly priced and financially constrained firms should forgo posi-
tive net present value projects if a lack of financing exists. If the firm’s stock becomes
overpriced, the financial constraint is relaxed, the manager is able to issue extra eq-
uity or debt and the positive net present value project might proceed. To separate
the catering and the market timing channels, it is important to study a subset of
relatively financially unconstrained firms. This gives rise to the following empirical
prediction:
Hypothesis 3: In a set of financially unconstrained firms, corpo-
rate investment should increase with stock price pressure driven
by mutual fund extreme flows.
A subset of firms with relatively low financial constraints presents a sig-
nificant investment reaction to lagged price pressure. For similar reasons,
the same is true for a subset of firms that do not issue equity around the
investment period.
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Using the subsamples described above, I study the effects of lagged price pressure
on firm investment in subsets of firms that do not need to raise external securities.
In particular, I also study a subsample of firms that are not conducting SEOs around
the investment period. Firm managers can still raise external securities when the
firm does not need to seek external funding for their projects to arbitrage a high
stock price. However, evidence consistent with a direct effect of price pressure on
investment can be gathered if it is found that investment is still sensitive to stock
price pressure when the firm does not issue equity.
Only firm managers with short-term incentives should react to high price pressure
by investing more, even if the firm is not financially constrained. If shareholders have
short-term horizons and do not know the quality of the project, the firm manager has
more incentive to invest and, therefore, to boost the share price. For similar reasons,
investment should be more sensitive to stock price pressure if the firm’s assets are
opaque because it takes shareholders longer to determine the quality of the project.
Hypothesis 4: Managers of firms with short-term shareholders
should invest more than managers of firms with long-term share-
holders. Managers of firms with more opaque assets should in-
vest more than managers of firms with less opaque assets.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Mutual Fund Data
U.S. mutual fund data come from the following 2 datasets : Thomson Financial
CDA/Spectrum s12 for holdings data (CDA/s12) and CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S.
Mutual Fund Database (CRSP/MFDB), used for computing flow data. CDA/s12
provides quarterly holdings of U.S. mutual funds. CRSP/MFDB provides data on
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monthly total returns and monthly total net assets (TNA), used to infer mutual fund
flows, and also contains extra information on the fund, including investment style and
fee structure. I use the MFLINKS dataset to merge CDA/s12 and CRSP/MFDB.
This method not only provides the identifiers to link the holdings and flow datasets
but also enables the identification of single funds that are represented as different
funds in CDA/s12 or CRSP/MFDB.5 The final merged mutual fund dataset contains
quarterly observations from 1991 to 2009.
The quarterly portfolio holdings provided by CDA/s12 are adjusted for corporate
actions using the CRSP variable cumulative factor to adjust shares/volume. I run 4
filters to guarantee that the data are reliable. After passing filter 1, only fund months
for which 0.5 < TNAf,t
TNAf,t−1
< 3 are kept to eliminate potential data errors. Filter
2 requires funds to be small enough at least for one period, i.e., mint(TNAf,t) <
US$ 1 Billion. Filter 3 compares TNAs from the merged datasets CDA/s12 and
CRSP/MFDB. If the TNAs differ too much, the fund-month observation is eliminated
(the fund-month observation is kept only if 1
1.3
< TNA(CDA/s12)
TNA(CRSP/MFDB)
< 1.3). Finally,
filter 4 guarantees that the dataset contains mostly domestic equity funds; all funds
whose investment objective codes are international (ioc=1), municipal bonds (ioc=5),
bonds and preferred (ioc=6) and metals (ioc=8) are eliminated.
Panel A of Table 2.1 describes the summary statistics of mutual funds’ equity
holdings after filters were passed. There are 4,717 unique mutual funds and 121,917
fund-quarter observations from the first quarter of 1991 to the second quarter of
2010. The median number of equity holdings per fund is relatively stable over the
years, although the average increases considerably in the latter part of the sample.
5For instance, in CRSP/MFSB, there are funds that are offered as different share classes but
that represent a single entity. In MFLINKS, those funds are assigned a unique identifier that I
use to identify a single fund in the merged dataset. Similarly, some funds in CDA/s12 arbitrarily
change names, although the fund remains the same; other groups of funds represent one single
portfolio managed by one single person but offered under different fee structures and different names.
MFLINKS allows those cases to be aggregated under one single fund.
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In 2009, a fund held, on average, 148.7 equity holdings in its portfolio. The same
pattern applies to the dollar value of the fund equity holdings. In 2009, a fund held,
on average US$ 1.26 billion, in U.S. stocks. The number of stocks held by at least
one mutual fund fluctuates between 5,000 and 7,000. Finally, it is relevant that the
proportion of the dollar value of U.S. stocks held by all mutual funds in the dataset
increases considerably over the years and is 12.93% in 2009.
2.4.2 Fund Flows
The monthly net flows into mutual funds are computed using TNAs and monthly
net returns from CRSP/MFDB. Borrowing from the mutual fund literature, monthly
flows are computed in the following way:
FLOWf,t = TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 +Rf,t)
flowf,t =
FLOWf,t
TNAf,t−1
FLOW represents the net dollar value that retail investors deposit in a mutual fund
during a month, whereas flow is the proportion of FLOW as the beginning-of-month
TNA.
The fund flow data are described in Panel B of Table 2.1. The 3-month and
6-month cumulative proportionate flows are highly correlated, and the latter flow
shows a wider distribution than the former, illustrating the consequences of the known
persistence of fund flows. The growth in the mutual fund industry can be ascertained
by the fact that in most years, the mean of fund flows is significantly positive; only
in 2008 and 2009 were the fund flows’ means negative. Another striking feature of
fund flows is their positive skewness; that is, the 90th percentile is higher than the
absolute value of the 10th percentile.
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2.4.3 Other Data
Accounting data such as earnings, book value of assets and capital expenditure
come from Compustat North America, which provides annual data on active and
inactive U.S. publicly held companies from income statements, balance sheets, state-
ment of cash flows, and other supplemental sources. Financial and utilities firms and
firms whose total assets are less than US$ 10 million are excluded from the dataset.
The merged mutual fund flow and holdings dataset CDA/s12 - CRSP/MFDB is
intersected with Compustat, and the final dataset contains annual data from 1992 to
2010. The summary statistics can be found in Table 2.2. To exclude data errors and
odd outliers, all variables are Winsorized at the 1% level.
Finally, data on U.S. seasoned equity offerings come from Thomson Securities
Data Center. Stock prices and stock returns data come from the CRSP U.S. stock
database. Both datasets are linked to the CDA/s12 - CRSP/MFDB - Compustat
merged datasets using the unique stock identifier CUSIP.
2.4.4 Stock Price Pressure
I employ a flow-related measure at the stock level, as in Coval and Stafford (2007),
to measure shifts in stock demand. Mutual funds, which own a significant aggregate
amount of holdings of U.S. firms, are liquid institutional investors that generally do
not hold a considerable amount of cash for regulatory or market reasons. In turn,
when faced with relevant outflows (inflows) from their retail investors, their main
reaction is to reduce (expand) their existing equity holdings. This leads to non-
fundamental shocks in the stock demand. Furthermore, this effect can be amplified
if a stock is held by many funds under extreme flows, as described in Anton and Polk
(2010) and Greenwood and Thesmar (2011).
The price pressure measure is constructed at the stock-period level and reflects
flows over the previous 12 months. This measure is built in the following two stages:
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(i) first, a quarterly measure is calculated to assess the number of purchases by funds
under extreme flows, netted out of the number of sales by funds under extreme out-
flows as a proportion of total shares outstanding; (ii) second, an annual price pressure
measure is computed by averaging the quarterly measure over the previous 4 quarters.
First stage:
PP 3ms,t =
∑
f max(0,∆holdingsf,s,t|flowf,t−3:t ≥ 90thp)
shares outstandings,t−1
+
−
∑
f max(0,−∆holdingsf,s,t|flowf,t−3:t ≤ 10thp)
shares outstandings,t−1
Second stage:
PPs,t =
PP 3ms,t + PP
3m
s,t−3 + PP
3m
s,t−6 + PP
3m
s,t−9
4
in which ∆holdingsf,s,t = holdingsf,s,t − holdingsf,s,t−3 is the change in fund f’s
holdings of stocks over the past 3 months; flowf,t−3:t is the cumulative monthly flows
into fund f over the past 3 months; and shares outstandings,t−1 is the total shares
outstanding in month t-1.
I test whether the price pressure measure is consistent with a reversal pattern in
stock prices. I run calendar-time portfolio regressions in which a zero-cost portfolio,
long in the top and short in the bottom decile of all U.S. stock quarters, is formed.
More precisely, in March, June, September and December of each year t, U.S. stocks
are sorted according to the price pressure variable. The equal-weighted and value-
weighted average returns of the high price pressure top decile portfolio and the low
price pressure bottom decile portfolio are calculated. For December of year t and
January and February of year t+1, the strategy buys the high price pressure portfolio
and sells the low price pressure portfolio formed in December of year t. For September,
October and November of year t, the strategy buys the high price pressure portfolio
and sells the low price pressure portfolio formed in September of year t. For June,
July and August of year t, the strategy buys the high price pressure portfolio and
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sells the low price pressure portfolio formed in June of year t. For March, April and
May of year t, the strategy buys the high price pressure portfolio and sells the low
price pressure portfolio formed in March of year t. Returns using this strategy are
computed for various holdings periods, one for each row of Table 2.3. Equal-weighted
returns of overlapping portfolios for different holding periods are computed. Finally,
the dependent variable is the excess return, which is equal to the overlapping portfolio
return minus the U.S. risk-free rate. Four different specifications are run, controlling
for the following sets of risk factors: (i) no risk factors; (ii) only the market factor
(MKT); (iii) the factors market (MKT), size (SMB) and value (HML); and (iv) the
factors market (MKT), size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (UMD).
RPP,t −Rf,t = α + t
RPP,t −Rf,t = α + β1(RM,t −Rf,t) + t
RPP,t −Rf,t = α + β1(RM,t −Rf,t) + β2RSMB,t + β3RHML,t + t
RPP,t −Rf,t = α + β1(RM,t −Rf,t) + β2RSMB,t + β3RHML,t + β4RUMD,t + t
The calendar-time portfolio return results are consistent with a reversal pattern
associated with stock price pressure. In Table 3, the estimated intercept α coefficients
are reported. As expected, the portfolios long in high price pressure and short in
low price pressure are linked to future significant negative returns. For the equally
weighted portfolios held from quarter 5 to 12 after the portfolio formation, excess
monthly returns are -0.74% (-0.62% when controlled for 3 risk factors and -0.58%
when controlled for 4 risk factors). For value-weighted portfolios, the returns are
slightly lower in absolute value, in line with the fact that mutual funds concentrate
their portfolios in large liquid stocks. For the holding period from quarter 5 to 12
after the portfolio formation, the value-weighted portfolio excess monthly returns are
-0.63% (-0.60% when controlled for 3 risk factors and -0.56% when controlled for 4
risk factors).
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Corporate Investment and Price Pressure
Having shown that the price pressure variable is consistent with a return rever-
sal pattern, I proceed to investigate whether this finding affects future corporate
investment policy. Controlling for other determinants of investment policy, including
Tobin’s Q, cash flow, cash from equity issuance and past stock returns, I run the
following specification:
Is,t
Ks,t−12
=fs + yt + β1PPs,t−12 + β2Qs,t−12 + β3
CFs,t−12
Ks,t−24
+ β4
Es,t
Ks,t−12
+
+β5Rs,t−13:t−12 + β6Rs,t−24:t−13 + β7Rs,t−72:t−24 + s,t
The dependent variable is investment (capital expenditure) as a proportion of
beginning-of-year capital (net property, plant and equipment). The main regressor
is the lagged price pressure variable, which uses the change in holdings and flows
between lags of 12 and 24 months. Because only firms with fiscal year-end months in
December are included, there is no overlap between the investment period6 and the
period over which the price pressure variable is measured.
To control for the fact that firms might be investing more as a result of more
available investment opportunities, the lagged marginal Tobin’s Q ratio is proxied by
the lagged average Q ratio, which is defined as the market value of assets7 divided
by the book value of assets. Much evidence is found in the literature that firms
that have a higher net worth invest more. To control for this effect, lagged cash
flow as a proportion of beginning-of-year capital, which equals the sum of earnings
before extraordinary items and depreciation over beginning-of-year capital, is included
as a control. Because I am interested in identifying an investment channel that is
independent of external financing, I also control for cash from equity issuance.
6The investment period is between months t-12 and t.
7A firm’s market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common
stock less the sum of book value of common stock and balance sheet deferred taxes.
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One concern is that the price pressure variable might contain information on the
fundamentals of the firm. To address this issue, I include past stock returns from
month t-72 until month t-12 as additional regressors. Under this approach, the coef-
ficient on the price pressure variable is orthogonal to past stock returns and becomes
a better proxy for the effect of stock uninformative demand on firm investment.
In addition, firm fixed effects and year effects are also used, and standard errors
are clustered at the firm level. Finally, all firm-years for which the aggregate mutual
fund ownership in the dataset is lower than 1% are excluded.
The results shown in Table 3.3 confirm that lagged priced pressure positively and
significantly influences corporate investment. In the specification with lagged price
pressure, including Tobin’s Q, cash flow and cash from equity issuance, the main
coefficient of investment on lagged price pressure is 5.285 (t=4.17). This effect is
economically important; an increase of one standard deviation in the lagged price
pressure variable leads to an increase in investment as a proportion of lagged capital
of 1.84%, which corresponds to 2.30% standard deviations and 8.33% of the median
of the same variable. Across all specifications, the main coefficient is positive and
significant at the 1% level. The specification that also includes past stock returns has
an estimated coefficient of the investment sensitivity to lagged price pressure of 3.680
(t=2.79). The effect remains economically important; an increase of one standard
deviation in the lagged price pressure variable leads to an increase in investment as a
proportion of lagged capital of 1.28%, which corresponds to 1.60% standard deviations
and 5.80% of the median of the same variable.
2.5.2 High Price Pressure, High Investment and Lower Future
Performance
Because lagged stock price pressure is positively related to future firm investment,
it is reasonable to investigate the channel through which the uninformative component
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of stock prices influences a firm manager’s decision to invest. If high price pressure
allows the firm manager to finance value-enhancing projects that previously lacked
funding, the decision to adopt the investment project increases the firm’s future per-
formance. In contrast, if high price pressure leads the firm manager to execute a
value-destroying project, the decision to adopt the investment project decreases the
firm’s future performance8.
Since lagged stock price pressure is positive related to future firm investment, it is
natural to investigate through which channel the uninformative component of stock
prices influences the firm manager decision to invest. If high price pressure allows the
firm manager to finance value-enhancing projects that previously lacked funding, the
decision to execute the investment project increases the firm’s future performance.
In contrast, if high price pressure leads the firm manager to execute value-destroying
project, the decision to execute the investment project decreases the firm’s future
performance9.
It is particularly challenging to identify through future performance whether high
price pressure leads the firm manager to execute either value-enhancing or value-
destroying projects. The reason is that high price pressure predicts future lower
returns. I address this concern in the following two ways: (i) I run Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regressions with future monthly stock returns as the dependent variable and
study the interaction between firm investment and price pressure; (ii) I also investigate
the effect of investment and price pressure on operational performance and run pooled
OLS regressions with the change in return on assets as the dependent variable.
First, I use future monthly stock returns from 6 until 18 months after the end
8While it is clear that the execution of value-destroying projects should lead to future firm
underperformance, the effects of the non-execution of value-enhancing projects are less clear. Unless
those projects are once in a lifetime opportunities and can only be executed at a specific time, firms
could wait for a better timing to execute the project.
9Although it is clear that the execution of value-destroying projects should lead to future firm
underperformance, the effects of the non-execution of value-enhancing projects are less clear. Unless
those projects are once-in-a-lifetime opportunities and can only be executed at a specific time, firms
could wait for better timing to execute the project.
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of the investment period as the dependent variable in Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regressions.10 The main regressors are the log of current investment over lagged
capital, the lagged stock price pressure and their interaction. I also use as controls
the log of Tobin’s Q, cash flow as a ratio of lagged capital, momentum11, and their
interaction with lagged price pressure.
Rs,t+6,t+18 =β1ln(
Is,t
Ks,t−12
) + β2PPs,t−12 + β3PPs,t−12 ∗ ln( Is,t
Ks,t−12
)+
+β4ln(Qs,t) + β5
CFs,t
Ks,t−12
+ β6MoMt + β7PPs,t−12 ∗ ln(Qs,t)+
+β8PPs,t−12 ∗ CFs,t
Ks,t−12
+ β9PPs,t−12 ∗MoMt + s,t
Consistent with firm managers’ execution of value-destroying projects, in Ta-
ble 2.5, I find an estimated coefficient of the interaction between investment and
price pressure β3 of -0.428 (t=-3.12). One possible interpretation is that a firm with
high price pressure that invests more than another firm with an equally high price
pressure has lower future returns12. This result suggests that firms with high price
pressure that invest too much are destroying value and, thus, are executing negative
net present value projects.
I also confirm previous results found in the literature that firms that invest too
much have lower future stock returns, as shown in Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) and
Polk and Sapienza (2009). The coefficient of future stock returns on current log
investment over lagged capital is negative, stable across specifications and significant
at the 1% level for most specifications. The coefficient on lagged price pressure is also
negative and significant, in line with the reversal pattern documented in Section 2.5.
Second, I test future firm performance by using an accounting variable rather than
10The methodology consists of two stages. In the first stage, cross-sectional OLS estimates are run
for each period. In the second stage, the estimated coefficients means and standard errors, which
are shown in Table 2.5, are computed.
11Momentum is defined as the cumulative past stock abnormal return from month t-12 to month
t-1.
12It is a concern that the regressor is actual investment and not the surprise in investment. I
assume that firms that invest more had higher expected investment.
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a market-based variable. I run pooled OLS regressions with the change in return on
assets as the dependent variable. Return on assets (ROA) is defined as operating
income before depreciation as a proportion of beginning-of-year assets. I use ROA in
year 1 minus current ROA as the measure of future firm performance.
∆(ROA)t,t+12 =β1ln(
Is,t
Ks,t−12
) + β2PPs,t−12 + β3PPs,t−12 ∗ ln( Is,t
Ks,t−12
)+
+β4ln(Qs,t) + β5
CFs,t
Ks,t−12
+ β6MoMt + β7PPs,t−12 ∗ ln(Qs,t)+
+β8PPs,t−12 ∗ CFs,t
Ks,t−12
+ β9PPs,t−12 ∗MoMt + s,t
Results in Table 2.6 indicate that firms with high price pressure and high invest-
ment have lower future operational performance. The main coefficient of the interac-
tion between investment and price pressure has always a negative point estimate and
is significant for 2 specifications when industry fixed effects are used. The coefficients
on investment and on price pressure are always negative and in most specifications
significant, suggesting high-price-pressure firms and high-investment firms have lower
future operational performance.
Together, the future performance regressions indicate there is a direct effect of
stock price pressure on the execution of negative net present value projects.
2.5.3 Firm Investment when External Finance is Not Needed
In this section, I provide evidence of a link between stock price pressure and
firm investment that does not rely on external finance. I show that the investment
sensitivity to lagged price pressure remains economically and significantly positive
to a subset of firms that are relatively financially unconstrained, according to the
following 2 indices of financial constraints: (i) the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) KZ
index, built by Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001); and (ii) the Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) size-age SA index. To complement the study on the direct influence of high
stock price pressure on firm investment, I also investigate a subset of firms that do not
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issue equity around the investment period and find that the investment sensitivity to
stock price pressure is still positive and significant.
Financially Unconstrained Firms
In Table 2.7, I split the sample into the following 2 subsets: (i) High KZ, for
relatively financially constrained firm years, or those whose KZ index is above the KZ
median in the same year; (ii) Low KZ, for relatively financially unconstrained firm
years, or those whose KZ index is below the KZ median in the same year. The KZ
index of financial constraint is as follows:
KZt =− 1.001909 CFt
Kt−1
+ 0.2826389Qt + 3.139193
debtt
debtt + equityt
+
− 39.3678 divt
Kt−1
− 1.314759Casht
Kt−1
A firm is more financially constrained in year t if its Tobin’s Q and its book leverage
(Levt = debttdebtt+equityt ) are higher and if its cash flow, dividends and cash balance as a
ratio of beginning of the year capital are lower.
The results indicate that there is an operating investment channel for the Low
KZ group of relatively financially unconstrained firms. The investment sensitivity
of lagged price pressure has a coefficient of 5.451 (t=2.08) in the specification that
includes all past stock returns. This finding has economic relevance; an increase
of one standard deviation in lagged price pressure leads to an increase of 1.90% in
investment over lagged capital. Notably, across all specifications, the point-estimate
coefficient for the High KZ group of relatively financially constrained firms is lower
than the point-estimate coefficient for the Low KZ group of relatively financially
unconstrained firms.
In Table 2.8, I implement a similar test but now use the SA index of financial
constraints, which has a low correlation with the KZ index given that they do not
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have any common components:
SAt = −0.737ln(Sizet) + 0.043[ln(Sizet)]2 − 0.040Aget
in which Size is equal to total assets and is capped at ln (US$ 4.5 billion). Age is
capped at 37. The higher the SA index, i.e., the smaller and the younger the firm,
the more financially constrained is the firm.
In a similar way, I split the sample into a subset of High SA, relatively financially
constrained firms and Low SA, relatively financially unconstrained firms. The Low
SA specification that includes all past stock returns has a coefficient of 2.834 (t=2.59).
An increase of one standard deviation in the lagged price pressure is equivalent to an
increase of 0.99% of investment over lagged capital. The coefficient of the High SA,
relatively financially constrained firms is always positive but is not significant at the
10% level across all specifications.
Firms that Do Not Conduct SEOs
The results above demonstrate that high stock price pressure predicts future in-
vestment in relatively financially unconstrained firms, suggesting a working invest-
ment channel that operates independently of external finance. Although firms with
plentiful internal funds can still raise external securities when there is high stock price
pressure13, it is worth investigating whether high stock price pressure can still explain
future investment even for firms that do not seek to raise external securities.
In Table 2.9, I exclude all firms that went through at least one seasoned equity
offering in the investment year and in the year preceding the investment year. I
identify firms that have an SEO in a year using the Thomson Securities Data Center
dataset. Table 2.14 presents summary statistics for SEOs by year. I then intersect the
SEO data with the merged firm-year-level dataset and exclude from the sample all
13Loughran and Ritter (1995) show that firms conducting initial public offerings or seasoned equity
offerings underperform non-issuing firms during the 5 years after the offering date.
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firms that went through at least 1 SEO in the current and previous years. Lagged price
pressure remains positive and significantly predicts investment. The coefficient in the
specification with all past returns as regressors is 3.232 (t=2.25), which corresponds
to a 1 standard deviation increase in the lagged price pressure having an effect of
increasing in 1.12% investment over lagged capital. This finding provides additional
evidence of a direct channel of stock mispricing influencing future firm investment.
2.5.4 Short-Term Horizon Shareholders
Models from Stein (1996) and Polk and Sapienza (2009) predict that firm managers
cater more if shareholders have a shorter horizon. If there is high price pressure from
mutual fund flows and the firm manager executes a negative net present value project,
shareholders will profit from the temporary stock overpricing only if they sell their
holdings before it becomes publicly known that the project was value-destroying.
Anticipating that, the firm manager will only proceed with the negative net present
value project if shareholders have a short enough horizon.
To test this prediction, I use mutual fund churn rates projected at the stock level
as a proxy for shareholders’ horizons. Firms whose mutual fund shareholders churn
often, i.e., frequently trade their holdings, are considered firms with a short-term
horizon. To build a proxy for short-term horizons at the firm-year level, two steps
are employed. In the first step, the churn rate at the fund-quarter level is built.
Borrowing from Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005), churn rate at the fund level is
depicted by the following:
CRf,t = 2
∑
s∈S | (Nf,s,t −Nf,s,t−3)Ps,t |∑
s∈S Nf,s,tPs,t +Nf,s,t−3Ps,t−3
where Nf,s,t is the number of shares held in firm s by mutual fund f in period t and
Ps,t is the share price in dollars of firm s in period t. Mutual funds that churn more
are considered having a shorter-term horizon.
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To assess a firm’s horizon, the churn rate at the stock-quarter level is built by
projecting mutual fund churn rates at the stock level and averaging them over 4
consecutive quarters as follows.
CRs,t =
∑
f∈F
ωs,f,t
1
4
(CRf,t + CRf,t−3 + CRf,t−6 + CRf,t−9)
where ωs,f,t is the proportion of shares of mutual fund f in firm s in quarter t with
respect to total shares outstanding of firm s in period t. The churn ratio at the
stock-year level is a fund-weighted average of the churn rate at the fund-quarter level
of the last four quarters. A high (low) stock-year churn rate indicates a short-term
(long-term) mutual fund shareholder.
In Table 2.10, I sort firms according to last year’s churn rate at the stock level
CRs,t−12. A Low CR represents long-horizon shareholders, or those in the bottom 3
deciles of last year’s churn rate. A High CR represents short-horizon shareholders, or
those in the top 3 deciles of last year’s churn rate.
The results are in line with the catering model cross-sectional predictions. The
main coefficients of investment on lagged price pressure in the subsamples with high
churn rates are higher than the subsamples with low churn rates across all specifica-
tions. In the specification without past stock returns as regressors, the coefficient on
High CR is 8.085 (t=2.58) and the coefficient on Low CR is 1.195 (t=0.54). In the
specification with all past stock returns as regressors, the coefficient on High CR is
6.535 (t=2.01) and the coefficient on Low CR is 3.565 (t=1.57). Those estimates are
consistent with a firm manager with steeper incentives to maximize the current stock
price reacting more strongly to high price pressure when investing.
2.5.5 Firms with More Opaque Assets
If shareholders cannot easily ascertain how the firm’s invested projects are faring,
they will place a higher importance on simple sets of information such as how much
rather than how well the firm is investing. In firms with opaque assets, such as those
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in the IT or pharmaceutical industries, it takes much longer for shareholders to find
out how the projects currently being initiated will perform. The lack of transparency
in a firm’s assets creates catering incentives for firm managers, who more easily engage
in value-destroying projects if there is high stock price pressure and a lack of good
projects.
In Table 2.11, I test whether the investment sensitivity to stock price pressure is
higher for firms with more opaque assets. I proxy asset opaqueness by R&D intensity,
defined as research and development expenses as a proportion of beginning-of-the-year
assets14.
Firm-years for which last year’s R&D intensity are above the median of last year’s
R&D intensity for all firms are considered to be firms with more opaque assets, in
which case catering should be stronger. The coefficient estimates are as expected.
The subsamples with High R&D intensity have high positive investment-lagged price
pressure coefficients significant at the 1% level. In the specification without past stock
returns as controls, the High R&D coefficient is 8.141 (t=2.51), higher than the Low
R&D coefficient 4.633 (t=2.10). The inclusion of past stock returns as controls does
not seem to change the main result. The High R&D coefficient is 7.520 (t=1.94), still
higher than the Low R&D coefficient 2.267 (t=1.30).
2.6 Robustness Tests
2.6.1 Measurement Error in Q
It is concerning that one of the regressors, the proxy for investment opportunities,
is the observable average Q rather than the unobservable marginal Q. If the price
pressure variable contains information about investment opportunities and marginal
Q is not properly measured, the interpretation of results might be compromised.
14The use of R&D intensity as a proxy of opaqueness is supported by Aboody and Lev (2000),
who show that insider gains in firms with R&D are considerably larger than in firms without R&D.
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To handle this errors-in-variables problem, I use Erickson and Whited (2002) and
Erickson and Whited (2000)’s methodology, which exploits higher-order moments
equations that produce a measurement error consistent GMM estimator for the effect
of Q on investment. I run Tim Erickson and Toni Whited’s Stata code for unbalanced
panels, which executes the identification diagnostic tests and computes the estimators.
Results in Table 2.12 show that the estimates in the specification without fixed
effects for the lagged price pressure variable’s effect on investment remain economi-
cally and statistically significant for the higher moments estimators, which reassures
us that the results are not undermined by the measurement error problem.
2.6.2 Price Pressure Variables
In this subsection, I show that the results are robust for the definition of the price
pressure variable. Until now, I have been using the price pressure variable defined
in Equation2.4.4. Below, I define 3 slightly different versions of the price pressure
variable, which are borrowed from Coval and Stafford (2007) (PP2 and PP3) and
from Gao and Lou (2011) (PP4):
PP23ms,t =
∑
f max(0,∆holdingsf,s,t)×max(0, f lowf,t−3:t)
Volumes,t−12:t−6
−
∑
f max(0,−∆holdingsf,s,t)×max(0,−flowf,t−3:t)
Volumes,t−12:t−6
PP33ms,t =
∑
f max(0,∆holdingsf,s,t|flowf,t−3:t ≥ 90thp)
Volumes,t−12:t−6
−
∑
f max(0,−∆holdingsf,s,t|flowf,t−3:t ≤ 10thp)
Volumes,t−12:t−6
PP43ms,t =
∑
f [flowf,t−3:t × holdingsf,s,t−3]∑
f holdingsf,s,t−3
in which ∆holdingsf,s,t = holdingsf,s,t − holdingsf,s,t−3 is the change in fund f’s
holdings of stock s over the past 3 months; flowf,t−3:t is the cumulative monthly
flows into fund f over the past 3 months; and V olumes,t−12:t−6 is the total stock
cumulated volume traded in number of shares from months t-12 to month t-6.
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Finally, all quarterly price pressure variables are averaged as the original one to
reflect the past 12 months’ flows:
PPks,t =
PPk3ms,t + PPk
3m
s,t−3 + PPk
3m
s,t−6 + PPk
3m
s,t−9
4
PP2 and PP4 take into account flows from all funds, unlike PP and PP3, which
only reflect extreme flows. The difference between PP2 and PP4 is stark; whereas PP2
takes into account purchases (sales) from funds with positive (negative) flows scaled
by the total cumulated volume traded between months t-12 and t-6, PP4 emphasizes
the flows rather than stock trades and only uses the holdings of funds as weights
when aggregating the flows of all funds that have holdings in the stock s. In contrast,
the difference between PP and PP3 is quite subtle; whereas the latter uses the total
cumulated volume traded between months t-12 and t-6, the former uses the total
number of shares outstanding in month t-1 as a denominator.
I then rerun the same regressions run in Table 3.3 and present the results in Ta-
ble 2.13. Each row corresponds to a different price pressure variable and each column
to a different specification that includes different past stock return controls. I omit
the control coefficients estimates for the sake of highlighting the main investment-
price-pressure coefficient. Notably, almost all estimates are positive, and many are
significant.
In terms of economic significance, there is also resemblance to the original PP
variable. An increase of one standard deviation in PP, PP2, PP3 and PP4 has an
effect of, respectively, increasing 1.60%, 0.97%, 1.14% and 0.31% standard deviations
of the investment over lagged capital variable, which represents 5.80%, 3.53%, 4.14%
and 1.12% of the median of the same variable.
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2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provides evidence that relatively financially unconstrained firms
might react to high stock price pressure from mutual funds by investing in nega-
tive net present value projects, catering to short-term shareholders who expect that
the firm presents good investment opportunities. By investing, the firm manager aims
to increase the stock price in the near term and hopes that the short-term sharehold-
ers will sell their stakes in the firm before knowledge becomes public that the project
was value-destroying.
Natural extensions of the analysis might include studying how some firm man-
agers’ characteristics, such as horizon, degree of overconfidence/optimism and share
of the total firm’s shares outstanding, might affect the catering mechanism. One rea-
son why firm managers try to maximize the wealth of the average current shareholder
rather than the long-term value of the firm is that, in general, current sharehold-
ers have the power to fire a firm manager if they are not satisfied with her actions.
One possible point of contention is the possibility that the investment policy and the
catering incentive might reflect a firm with powerful shareholders and a less powerful
firm manager. In contrast, if the firm manager is a family founder or an important
stakeholder in the firm, I expect the catering mechanism to be weaker because the
firm manager can focus on a longer-horizon objective for her actions. Of course,
this is the same reason underlying the fact that a firm manager with shorter hori-
zon should cater more. Perhaps a more interesting analysis is the interaction of the
catering effects with proxies for a firm manager’s overconfidence and optimism. On
the one hand, such a firm manager should invest more than if she were not overconfi-
dent/optimistic because she believes stock returns are higher than they actually are
or that stock returns are less volatile than they actually are. That finding would be
consistent with more overinvestment for overpriced firms and less underinvestment for
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underpriced firms. On the other hand, an overconfident/optimistic manager should
not care as much about what shareholders think and should pay less attention to
price pressure proxies. Investigations on the above-mentioned trade-off and on the
interaction between catering with firm manager overconfidence/optimism are worthy
of future study.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulated Returns on an High Price Pressure Portfolio. The figure shows the cumulated return of a portfolio long in high and short in
low price pressure stocks.
0.98
1.03
1.08
1.13
1.18
-12-11-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
P
o
r
t
f
o
l
i
o
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
Months since portfolio formation
Cumulated Return on an High Price Pressure Portfolio
89
Table 2.1: Mutual Fund Summary Statistics
This table reports end-of the-year US equity domestic mutual fund variables from 1991 to 2009. The
sample below is the intersection of the mutual fund equity holdings Thomson CDA/s12 and the survivor
bias free CRSP/MFDB datasets. The merging used the identifier provided by the database MFLinks. A
number of funds were excluded in order to guarantee the reliability of the data. For more details, see
description of filter in Section 2.4. Panel A describes equity holdings variables at the fund level. Number
of funds is the number of mutual funds at the end of the year. Number of equity holdings per fund is the
number of stock holdings held by each fund at the end of the year. US$ Million equity holdings per fund
is the total dollar value of all equity holdings held by a fund at the end of the year. Number of stocks
is the number of US stocks that are held by at least one mutual fund at the end of the year. Number
of fund-stocks is the aggregate number of stock holdings by all funds at the end of the year. US equity
market share is the dollar proportion of US stocks held by all mutual funds in the dataset at the end of
the year. Panel B describes flow variables at the fund level. TNA (US$ Million) is the Total Net Assets
per fund as reported in the CRSP/MFDB dataset. flow t:t-3 is the cumulative fund flow in the last
quarter. flow t:t-6 is the cumulative fund flow in the last 2 quarters. The monthly fund flow is defined as
TNAt−TNAt−1(Fund_Returnt)
TNAt−1
.
Panel A: Equity Holdings characteristics per fund
Year Number Number of US$ Million Number Number US equity
of equity holdings equity holdings of of market
funds per fund per fund stocks fund-stocks share
Mean Median Mean Median
1991 605 75.6 49.0 302.4 74.1 4062 45768 4.58%
1992 660 89.1 54.0 401.9 98.9 4248 58803 6.03%
1993 771 100.1 55.0 379.8 82.3 5681 77201 5.79%
1994 882 96.8 54.5 360.1 72.4 6152 85396 6.35%
1995 887 99.9 56.0 498.7 93.8 6435 88569 6.52%
1996 1142 98.8 61.0 563.9 96.2 6591 112808 7.76%
1997 1225 99.0 59.0 735.3 108.7 7081 121280 8.35%
1998 1422 100.2 57.5 844.5 113.4 6840 142441 9.04%
1999 1747 110.6 63.0 949.7 122.4 6923 193204 9.76%
2000 1865 110.3 60.0 875.7 128.0 7156 205645 10.49%
2001 1852 118.4 62.0 667.9 105.0 6658 219236 8.95%
2002 2014 127.0 64.0 619.7 85.7 5901 255799 11.32%
2003 2222 132.6 68.0 784.4 107.7 6245 294660 11.96%
2004 2383 126.4 65.0 933.4 131.0 5638 301219 13.52%
2005 2176 129.6 65.0 1143.0 147.1 6235 281968 14.32%
2006 2348 123.8 64.0 1266.4 166.9 6182 290615 15.22%
2007 2333 125.4 61.0 1322.2 171.9 6471 292637 15.55%
2008 2092 129.5 62.0 773.3 126.0 6174 270972 13.82%
2009 1548 148.7 75.5 1257.4 239.9 5510 230189 12.93%
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Table 2.1: Mutual Fund Summary Statistics(cont.)
Panel B: Flow characteristics per fund
Year TNA flow flow
(US$ Million) t:t-3 t:t-6
Mean Median 10thPctile Mean Median 90thPctile 10thPctile Mean Median 90thPctile
1991 409.1 102.9 -6.42% 5.22% 0.99% 19.94% -12.14% 11.86% 1.22% 38.67%
1992 558.1 144.8 -5.23% 8.44% 2.30% 24.57% -8.49% 12.04% 3.96% 40.40%
1993 561.0 128.8 -6.41% 6.35% 2.38% 22.37% -10.81% 17.37% 4.95% 51.86%
1994 550.2 112.8 -7.41% 3.37% -0.02% 13.25% -12.32% 8.00% 0.74% 31.97%
1995 758.8 140.9 -6.66% 3.76% 0.79% 16.78% -9.75% 13.75% 2.85% 42.20%
1996 790.1 134.3 -8.10% 5.67% 0.52% 19.00% -11.93% 13.62% 1.73% 39.85%
1997 1048.2 170.7 -6.10% 5.91% 1.22% 19.61% -9.64% 19.20% 3.38% 50.62%
1998 1131.5 162.6 -10.24% 2.26% -1.28% 13.96% -14.26% 6.18% -1.35% 26.06%
1999 1172.1 176.4 -12.01% 4.49% -1.93% 20.63% -16.80% 8.72% -2.27% 37.35%
2000 1125.6 185.1 -7.10% 4.68% -0.46% 16.51% -12.81% 10.96% 0.01% 37.33%
2001 846.5 144.6 -7.29% 5.05% -0.27% 21.20% -11.27% 7.20% -1.05% 29.05%
2002 793.8 125.0 -8.15% 2.05% -1.29% 14.29% -13.95% 3.02% -3.44% 22.65%
2003 1015.2 162.4 -7.86% 5.61% 0.71% 22.09% -11.98% 13.60% 2.02% 47.07%
2004 1242.1 195.9 -9.07% 3.15% -0.98% 16.68% -14.01% 6.13% -1.51% 29.60%
2005 1473.4 210.6 -7.87% 4.10% -0.71% 17.38% -15.11% 10.26% -1.37% 41.40%
2006 1677.4 261.7 -9.81% 0.56% -1.83% 12.81% -16.31% 2.91% -3.38% 29.87%
2007 1813.1 285.7 -10.33% 0.09% -1.84% 10.46% -15.64% 2.56% -3.00% 21.44%
2008 1087.0 189.5 -10.84% -1.94% -3.39% 6.64% -16.67% -1.09% -5.00% 14.20%
2009 1612.0 309.4 -8.51% -1.19% -2.08% 6.61% -16.66% -0.20% -3.68% 17.30%
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics at the firm-year level
All variables are at the firm-year level and the sample period is from 1991 to 2010. It
Kt−12
is the ratio of current
capital expenditure to beginning of the year net property, plant and equipment. Tobin’s Q, Qt−12, is last
year’s market value of assets divided by the book value of assets, At−1. A firm’s market value of assets equals
the book value of assets plus the market value of common stock less the sum of book value of common stock
and balance sheet deferred taxes. Cash flow, CFt−12
Kt−24
, equals the sum of last year’s earnings before extraordinary
items and depreciation over beginning-of-last-year capital. A firm’s price pressure PPt−12 is a ratio, in which the
numerator is the sum of fund-aggregated holdings purchases of funds for which flows are above the 90th percentile
minus the fund-aggregated holdings sales of funds for which flows are below the 10th percentile between 24 and
12 months ago, and the denominator is the average of number of shares outstanding over the same period.
Et
Kt−12
is cash from sale of common and preferred stocks over beginning of the year net property, plant and
equipment. Churnratet−12 is the mutual fund’s churn rate projected at the stock-year level and captures the
firm’s shareholder horizon through the fund’s portfolio turnover between 24 and 12 months ago. As in Gaspar
et al. (2005), the Mutual Fund Churn rate for fund f in quarter t is as follows: CRf,t = 2
∑
s∈S |(Nf,s,t−Nf,s,t−3)Ps,t|∑
s∈S Nf,s,tPs,t+Nf,s,t−3Ps,t−3
.
The Churn rate for firm s in year t is the fund-weighted average of CRf,t of the previous 4 quarters. R&Dt−1At−1 is last
year’s firm-year research and development intensity, which is last year’s research and development expenses over
beginning of last year’s book value of assets. The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) KZt financial constraint index is
as follows: KZt = −1.001909 CFtKt−1 +0.2826389Qt+3.139193 debttdebtt+equityt −39.3678 divtKt−1 −1.314759CashtKt−1 . The Size-
Age index of financial constraint, built by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), is as follows: SAt = −0.737ln(Sizet) +
0.043[ln(Sizet)]
2 − 0.040Aget. Rt−13:t−12 is the stock return from month t-13 to month t-12. Rt−24:t−13 is the
cumulative stock return from month t-24 to month t-13. Rt−48:t−24 is the cumulative stock return from month
t-48 to month t-24. Rt−72:t−24 is the cumulative stock return from month t-72 to month t-24. PP2t−12, PP3t−12
and PP4t−12 are alternative definitions of stock price pressure, which can be found in Subsection 2.6.2
.
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. dev.
PPt−12 23,487 .002046 .0007147 .003478
It
Kt−12
57,933 .4626 .2206 .7982
Qt−12 36,468 2.147 1.524 1.858
CFt−12
Kt−24
53,973 -1.277 .2229 9.714
Et
Kt−12
57,610 2.919 .02064 11.85
At 65,288 3,747 245.8 33,004
SAt 61,841 -3.144 -3.087 .7903
KZt 38,495 -11.26 -.9413 39.15
ROAt 59,984 .02621 .1091 .4922
Churnratet−12 24,804 .8265 .7675 .4314
R&Dt−12
At−12
30,728 .1166 .04266 .1962
Rt−13:t−12 38,372 .02654 .01396 .1535
Rt−24:t−13 34,969 .1145 .02701 .5594
Rt−48:t−24 29,444 .2761 .07024 .9077
Rt−72:t−24 25,105 .681 .2301 1.591
PP2t−12 21,773 .01045 .004901 .0161
PP3t−12 21,773 .007803 .002454 .01716
PP4t−12 22,848 .008558 .005111 .02629
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Table 2.3: Calendar-time portfolio regressions for a portfolio of firms long in high price
pressure
This table reports the coefficient estimates for the intercept term of monthly calendar-time equal-weighted
and value-weighted portfolio regressions. The monthly returns are computed for an equal-weighted and a
value-weighted portfolio that go long in the top and short in the bottom deciles in stocks sorted by quarterly
flow-induced price pressure (PP). The portfolios are rebalanced every quarter and held for up to 12 quarters.
Four different monthly returns are reported: the return in excess of the risk-free rate, the CAPM alpha, the
Fama-French three-factor alpha and the Fama-French three-factor augmented by the momentum factor. The
sample period is from 1993 to 2010. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Equally-weighted
Portfolio holding Excess MKT MKT, HML MKT, HML
period Return SMB SMB, UMD
Q0 -0.199% -0.285%* -0.097%* -0.319%**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Q1-4 -0.669%*** -0.756%*** -0.556%*** -0.618%***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Q5-8 -0.747%*** -0.839%*** -0.644%*** -0.586%***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Q5-12 -0.738%*** -0.803%*** -0.623%*** -0.572%***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Value-weighted
Portfolio holding Excess MKT MKT, HML MKT, HML
period Return SMB SMB, UMD
Q0 0.583%** 0.431%* 0.620%*** 0.318%
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Q1-4 -0.525%*** -0.707%*** -0.481%*** -0.552%***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Q5-8 -0.630%*** -0.847%*** -0.571%*** -0.554%***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Q5-12 -0.629%*** -0.799%*** -0.597%*** -0.563%***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 2.4: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and
equipment. Firm fixed effects and year effects are used in all OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted for clustering of the residual at the firm level. The sample contains annual observations and its period ranges
from 1992 to 2010. Only firm-years with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer
to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
PPt−12 8.585*** 4.837*** 5.285*** 5.320*** 4.883*** 3.643*** 3.680***
(1.323) (1.269) (1.266) (1.269) (1.268) (1.310) (1.318)
Qt−12 0.111*** 0.080*** 0.068*** 0.067*** 0.056*** 0.031*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
CFt−12
Kt−24
-0.006*** 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Et
Kt−12
0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Rt−13:t−12 0.035 0.029 0.036 0.000
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031)
Rt−24:t−13 0.059*** 0.075*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Rt−48:t−24 0.036***
(0.005)
Rt−72:t−24 0.017***
(0.003)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,140 35,455 21,887 21,475 21,355 21,211 18,244 15,892
R2 0.419 0.438 0.452 0.470 0.470 0.473 0.450 0.444
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Table 2.5: Fama and MacBeth (1973) Regressions - Future Stock Returns on Current Firm Investment and Lagged Price Pressure
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions are run. The dependent variable is the future monthly stock
return from 6 to 18 months after the end of the investment period. The Fama and MacBeth (1973)
regressions below consist in two stages. In the first, for each period, cross-sectional OLS estimates are
run. In the second stage, the estimated coefficients means and standard errors, which are shown in
the table below, are computed. MoMt is defined as stock momentum and is the abnormal cumulated
stock return from months t-24 to t-13. The specifications with other interactions with PPt−12 include
PPt−12 ∗ ln(Qt), PPt−12 ∗ CFtKt−12 and PPt−12 ∗MoMt. The sample contains observations from 1992 to
2010. Only firms with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and *
refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Rt+6,t+18
ln( It
Kt−12
) -0.004*** -0.002* -0.001 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PPt−12 -0.241 -0.502** -0.252* -1.040*** -0.272** -1.074***
(0.153) (0.227) (0.142) (0.270) (0.136) (0.270)
ln(Qt) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CFt
Kt−12
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPt−12 ∗ ln( ItKt−12 ) -0.234* -0.410*** -0.428***
(0.126) (0.133) (0.137)
MoMt 0.003 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.011** 0.000 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Other interactions with PPt−12 No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 411,828 261,944 261,944 247,228 247,228 245,528 245,528
R2 0.026 0.011 0.013 0.029 0.034 0.035 0.041
Number of months 228 225 225 225 225 225 225
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Table 2.6: Future Return on Assets on Current Firm Investment and Lagged Price Pressure
The dependent variable is the change in return on assets from year t to t+1. Return on assets is operational income
before depreciation as a proportion of beginning of year’s assets. Firm fixed effects and year effects are used in all
OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering of the residual at the firm
level. The sample contains annual observations and its period ranges from 1992 to 2010. Only firms with more than
1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: firm fixed effects
Dependent Variable: ∆ROAt,t+12
ln( It
Kt−12
) -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PPt−12 -0.611*** -1.008** -0.594** -1.438** -0.425* -1.045
(0.223) (0.425) (0.231) (0.653) (0.231) (0.639)
ln(Qt) 0.004 0.003 0.010*** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CFt
Kt−12
-0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PPt−12 ∗ ln( ItKt−12 ) -0.297 -0.420 -0.273
(0.243) (0.303) (0.292)
MoMt -0.021*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.023*** -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 31,919 20,194 20,194 18,982 18,982 18,863 18,863
R2 0.248 0.209 0.209 0.226 0.227 0.240 0.241
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Table 2.6: Future Return on Assets on Current Firm Investment and Lagged Price Pressure (cont.)
Panel B: industry fixed effects
Dependent Variable: ∆ROAt,t+12
ln( It
Kt−12
) -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PPt−12 -0.609*** -1.046*** -0.546*** -1.115*** -0.392*** -0.798**
(0.148) (0.196) (0.132) (0.363) (0.133) (0.399)
ln(Qt) 0.008* 0.008* 0.011*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CFt
Kt−12
-0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
PPt−12 ∗ ln( ItKt−12 ) -0.332** -0.380** -0.255
(0.133) (0.158) (0.164)
MoMt -0.020*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
Constant -0.020*** -0.015*** -0.013*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Industry Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 31,919 20,138 20,138 18,982 18,982 18,863 18,863
R2 0.043 0.035 0.035 0.051 0.051 0.059 0.059
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Table 2.7: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure sorted on Financial Constraints - KZ index
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and equipment. The sample is
split into less financially constrained and more financially constrained firms, according to the KZ index of financial constraints. High KZ is the
subsample containing firm-years above the KZ median-year, which corresponds to relatively financially constrained firms. Low KZ is the subsample
containing firm-years below the KZ median-year, which corresponds to relatively financially unconstrained firms. The Kaplan and Zingales (1997)
KZ index in the current year t is as follows: KZt = −1.001909 CFtKt−1 +0.2826389Qt+3.139193 debttdebtt+equityt −39.3678 divtKt−1 −1.314759CashtKt−1 . Firm fixed
effects and year effects are used in all OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering of the residual at
the firm level. The sample contains annual observations and its period ranges from 1992 to 2010. Only firm-years with more than 1% aggregate
mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
High KZ Low KZ High KZ Low KZ High KZ Low KZ High KZ Low KZ High KZ Low KZ
PPt−12 3.001*** 6.490** 3.001*** 6.455** 2.513*** 6.148** 1.663* 5.038* 1.652* 5.451**
(0.890) (2.544) (0.890) (2.544) (0.885) (2.528) (0.874) (2.606) (0.904) (2.621)
Qt−12 0.073*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.050*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.043*** 0.020**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
CFt−12
Kt−24
-0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Et
Kt−12
0.056*** 0.013*** 0.056*** 0.013*** 0.057*** 0.013*** 0.063*** 0.013*** 0.063*** 0.012***
(0.015) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.014) (0.004)
Rt−13:t−12 -0.004 0.056 -0.005 0.049 0.017 0.025 0.021 -0.048
(0.019) (0.054) (0.018) (0.054) (0.019) (0.056) (0.020) (0.059)
Rt−24:t−13 0.031*** 0.057*** 0.045*** 0.076*** 0.040*** 0.088***
(0.006) (0.015) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.017)
Rt−48:t−24 0.028*** 0.028***
(0.004) (0.010)
Rt−72:t−24 0.013*** 0.018***
(0.002) (0.006)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,714 10,143 10,714 10,143 10,646 10,071 9,190 8,631 7,952 7,566
R2 0.606 0.511 0.606 0.511 0.610 0.512 0.621 0.495 0.610 0.496
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Table 2.8: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure sorted on Financial Constraints - SA index
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and equipment. The sample
is split into less financially constrained and more financially constrained firms, according to the SA index of financial constraints. High SA is
the subsample containing firm-years above the SA median-year, which corresponds to relatively financially constrained firms. Low SA is the
subsample containing firm-years below the SA median-year, which corresponds to relatively financially unconstrained firms. The SA Size-Age
index of financial constraints, built by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), is as follows: SAt = −0.737ln(Sizet) + 0.043[ln(Sizet)]2 − 0.040Aget. Size is
equal total assets and is capped above at ln(US$ 4.5 Billion). Age is capped above at 37. Firm fixed effects and year effects are used in all OLS
regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering of the residual at the firm level. The sample contains annual
observations and its period ranges from 1992 to 2010. Only firm-years with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***,
** and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
High SA Low SA High SA Low SA High SA Low SA High SA Low SA High SA Low SA
PPt−12 3.004 4.752*** 3.217 4.756*** 3.235 4.222*** 3.819 2.900** 4.174 2.834***
(2.726) (1.376) (2.739) (1.377) (2.766) (1.360) (4.191) (1.171) (5.252) (1.094)
Qt−12 0.058*** 0.073*** 0.056*** 0.073*** 0.045*** 0.062*** 0.023** 0.037*** 0.024* 0.036***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007)
CFt−12
Kt−24
-0.003 0.019*** -0.004 0.019*** -0.004 0.019*** -0.005 0.017** -0.007 0.015*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
Et
Kt−12
0.015*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014** 0.017*** 0.011*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Rt−13:t−12 0.050 0.011 0.047 0.001 0.070 0.002 0.004 -0.009
(0.052) (0.032) (0.052) (0.032) (0.064) (0.030) (0.086) (0.029)
Rt−24:t−13 0.062*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073** 0.066***
(0.018) (0.010) (0.024) (0.011) (0.029) (0.010)
Rt−48:t−24 0.040*** 0.030***
(0.013) (0.006)
Rt−72:t−24 0.022** 0.012***
(0.011) (0.004)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,773 14,702 6,703 14,652 6,598 14,613 4,557 13,687 3,213 12,679
R2 0.520 0.490 0.518 0.490 0.519 0.494 0.497 0.476 0.513 0.448
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Table 2.9: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure when firms do not go through SEOs in the current and last years
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and
equipment. The sample is now restricted for firms that do not engage in seasoned equity offerings in the current and last
years. Firm fixed effects and year effects are used in all OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses are
adjusted for clustering of the residual at the firm level. The sample contains annual observations and its period ranges
from 1992 to 2010. Only firm-years with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer
to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
PPt−12 5.876*** 3.405*** 3.508*** 3.577*** 3.323*** 3.039** 3.232**
(1.252) (1.241) (1.252) (1.254) (1.252) (1.359) (1.434)
Qt−12 0.100*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
CFt−12
Kt−24
-0.005*** 0.005 0.006 0.007* 0.007* 0.008* 0.008
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Et
Kt−12
0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Rt−13:t−12 0.042 0.039 0.047* 0.025
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Rt−24:t−13 0.039*** 0.058*** 0.054***
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
Rt−48:t−24 0.038***
(0.006)
Rt−72:t−24 0.016***
(0.004)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,713 31,039 18,646 18,277 18,161 18,068 15,995 14,111
R2 0.453 0.428 0.470 0.490 0.491 0.493 0.475 0.464
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Table 2.10: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure sorted on Shareholder Horizon - Mutual Fund Churn Rate
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and equipment. The sample
is split into short horizon shareholder firms and long horizon shareholder firms, according to the mutual fund churn rate measure. As in Gaspar
et al. (2005), the mutual fund churn rate for fund f in quarter t is as follows: CRf,t = 2
∑
s∈S |(Nf,s,t−Nf,s,t−3)Ps,t|∑
s∈S Nf,s,tPs,t+Nf,s,t−3Ps,t−3
. The Churn rate for firm s in year
t CRs,t is the fund-weighted average of CRf,t of the previous 4 quarters. Short horizon shareholder firms are those with high churn rate, in the
top 3 deciles of the yearly distribution of CRs,t−12. Long horizon shareholder firms are those with low churn rate, in the bottom 3 deciles of the
yearly distribution of CRs,t−12. Firm fixed effects and year effects are used in all OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses
are adjusted for clustering of the residual at the firm level. The sample contains annual observations and its period ranges from 1992 to 2010.
Only firms with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR High CR Low CR
PPt−12 8.085*** 1.195 8.058** 1.410 7.679** 1.140 7.120** 1.769 6.535** 3.565
(3.130) (2.201) (3.163) (2.203) (3.165) (2.188) (3.569) (2.209) (3.252) (2.274)
Qt−12 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.025* 0.023 0.025**
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.012)
CFt−12
Kt−24
0.011 -0.007 0.011 -0.007 0.010 -0.007 0.012 -0.010 0.016 -0.013
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Et
Kt−12
0.019*** 0.014** 0.019*** 0.014** 0.020*** 0.014** 0.019** 0.015* 0.017** 0.015*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Rt−13:t−12 -0.051 0.178** -0.053 0.156** -0.039 0.172** -0.102 0.122
(0.068) (0.074) (0.068) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) (0.081) (0.082)
Rt−24:t−13 0.061*** 0.052** 0.067*** 0.086*** 0.078*** 0.092***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.025) (0.024) (0.027) (0.020)
Rt−48:t−24 0.019 0.038***
(0.017) (0.011)
Rt−72:t−24 0.023* 0.013**
(0.012) (0.006)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,039 6,344 5,989 6,294 5,942 6,257 4,967 5,407 4,243 4,705
R2 0.610 0.597 0.609 0.599 0.611 0.603 0.583 0.605 0.581 0.617
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Table 2.11: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure sorted on Research and Development Intensity
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and equipment. The sample
is split into firms with high intensity in research and development and low intensity in research and development. Each year, a firm falls in the
high (low) intensity category if its last year’s research and development expenses as a ratio of beginning of last year’s assets is above (below)
the median. HighR&D and LowR&D are respectively the subsets of high and low R&D intensity firms sorted according to R&D intensity in
the previous year. Firm fixed effects and year effects are used in all OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses are adjusted
for clustering of the residual at the firm level. The sample contains annual observations and its period ranges from 1992 to 2010. Only firms
with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D
PPt−12 8.141** 4.633** 8.231** 4.643** 7.848** 4.757** 7.387* 2.404 7.520* 2.267
(3.244) (2.202) (3.249) (2.215) (3.263) (2.229) (3.817) (1.624) (3.885) (1.750)
Qt−12 0.061*** 0.086*** 0.059*** 0.085*** 0.046*** 0.076*** 0.022** 0.033*** 0.015 0.041***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.008) (0.017) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
CFt−12
Kt−24
-0.003 0.020** -0.003 0.020** -0.003 0.020** -0.002 0.013 -0.002 0.013
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.023)
Et
Kt−12
0.014*** 0.012 0.014*** 0.012 0.014*** 0.011 0.015*** 0.011 0.014*** 0.013
(0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013)
Rt−13:t−12 0.059 0.007 0.060 0.015 0.068 -0.016 0.023 -0.000
(0.058) (0.044) (0.058) (0.043) (0.060) (0.040) (0.068) (0.045)
Rt−24:t−13 0.080*** 0.033*** 0.105*** 0.051*** 0.113*** 0.042***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013)
Rt−48:t−24 0.052*** 0.024***
(0.011) (0.008)
Rt−72:t−24 0.032*** 0.006
(0.007) (0.004)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 6,219 6,679 6,195 6,653 6,141 6,615 5,037 5,879 4,193 5,266
R2 0.436 0.592 0.435 0.592 0.440 0.592 0.409 0.565 0.421 0.556
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Table 2.12: Robustness Test: Higher order Moments Estimator
Erickson and Whited (2002) and Erickson and Whited (2000) higher-order moments estimators are run, in which the
mismeasured regressor is Qt−1. I use the Stata code provided in Toni Whited’s website, which executes the estimators and
the identification diagnostic tests for unbalanced panels developed in Erickson and Whited (2012). The dependent variable
is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to beginning of year net property, plant and equipment. The higher-order
moments estimators are on columns 2,3,4,6,7 and 8. Standard OLS regressors estimates are shown on columns 1 and 5.
Parentheses below the estimates show standard errors. The OLS standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using
the White procedure. τ 2 is the R2 of the measurement equation, which is an index of measurement quality. This index
ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating a worthless proxy and one indicating a perfect proxy. The sample
contains observations from 1992 to 2010. Only firms with more than 1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included.
***, ** and * refer to statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
OLS GMM5 GMM6 GMM7 OLS GMM5 GMM6 GMM7
PPt−12 6.654*** 222.516*** 117.079*** 52.537*** 2.879*** 88.678*** 61.763*** 55.874***
(0.948) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.986) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Qt−12 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
CFt−12
Kt−24
0.004** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.004** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Et
Kt−12
0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Rt−13:t−12 -0.001 0.075** 0.075** 0.075**
(0.026) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Rt−24:t−13 0.078*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Rt−72:t−24 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Firm Fixed Effects No No No No No No No No
Observations 21,475 21,475 21,475 21,475 15,892 15,892 15,892 15,892
R2 0.161 0.229 0.225 0.225 0.149 0.779 0.774 0.775
τ 2 0.012 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.063 0.068
103
Table 2.13: Robustness Test: Firm Investment on Lagged Price Pressure across Different Price Pressure Variables
The dependent variable is the ratio of current annual capital expenditure to begin-
ning of year net property, plant and equipment. Firm fixed effects and year effects
are used in all OLS regressions. The reported standard errors in parentheses are
adjusted for clustering of the residual at the firm level. The coefficients shown below
are for the lagged price pressure only. See Subsection 2.6.2 for the definition of the
price pressure variables. Each row represents a different price pressure variable as
main regressor. In all specifications, lagged Tobin’s Q, cash from equity issuance
over lagged capital and lagged cash flow as a proportion of beginning of year capital
are included. Moreover, each column has a different set of additional past stock
returns as controls, as specified in the column headline. The sample contains annual
observations and its period ranges from 1992 to 2010. Only firms with more than
1% aggregate mutual fund ownership are included. ***, ** and * refer to statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: It
Kt−12
Price No Rt−13:t−12 Rt−13:t−12 Rt−13:t−12
Pressure Returns Rt−24:t−13 Rt−24:t−13
Variable Controls Rt−72:t−24
PPt−12 5.285*** 5.320*** 4.883*** 3.680***
(1.266) (1.269) (1.268) (1.318)
PP2t−12 0.849*** 0.852*** 0.632*** 0.483**
(0.223) (0.223) (0.222) (0.224)
PP3t−12 0.814*** 0.812*** 0.658*** 0.532**
(0.217) (0.218) (0.216) (0.221)
PP4t−12 0.336** 0.337** 0.264 0.094
(0.167) (0.166) (0.166) (0.139)
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SE Clustered at the Firm Level Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 2.14: Number of Firms that Issued at least 1 SEO in the Current Year
This table reports the number of firms that issued at least 1 sea-
soned equity offering by year. The data comes from Thomson
Securities Data Center. The annual sample varies from 1991 to
2010.
Year Number of Firms
1991 439
1992 479
1993 722
1994 474
1995 590
1996 696
1997 619
1998 457
1999 407
2000 365
2001 353
2002 347
2003 402
2004 455
2005 374
2006 393
2007 406
2008 280
2009 706
2010 667
TOTAL 9,631
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Chapter 3
Information Asymmetries in Global
Institutional Investment
Co-authored with Harald Hau (University of Geneva) and Hélène Rey (London
Business School)
3.1 Introduction
Institutional investors enjoy a privileged access to executive officers and meet
them frequently. According to survey data, chief executives and chief financial offi-
cers dedicate 17 and 26 days per year to briefing their most important shareholders,
respectively. Do corporate executive pass on private information on such occasions
which allow institutional investors to time the market? Do the rare cases of insider
trading brought against fund managers hide an economically significant information
asymmetry in favor of institutional investors?
This paper examines more than 8 million institutional trades over the period 1999
to 2009 for their information content and finds strong evidence for institutional market
timing ability for large sell transactions in corporations where they hold large stakes.
The main results of this paper are threefold. First, we show that funds have
skills to sell their holdings but they experience losses in semesters that follow large
holding increases. By running quantile regressions of the change in portfolio weights
over the last six months on the risk-controlled stock return over the next 6 months,
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we are able to discern a S-shape, shown in Figure 3.2, consistent with the fact that
funds are able to sell their positions before negative stock returns, but do not increase
their holdings ahead of future positive stock returns. If the average OLS coefficient
is negative and significant at -0.625, indicating there is no stock picking skill on aver-
age, the significant coefficients at the 5% and 95% quantiles, respectively 1.549 and
-5.029, are consistent with skill only when funds are reducing or selling their stock
holdings. Second, when we introduce the dummies for international/domestic funds
and home/foreign stock positions, we can discern an advantage for local funds. At the
quantile 5%, the coefficient of the dummy for International Fund investing at Home
is -0.447 and the coefficient of the dummy for International Fund investing abroad
is -0.851. If we compare them to the baseline coefficient of 1.549, this corresponds
to a 29% and 55% lower market timing ability for the international/home and inter-
national/foreign funds, respectively. Those are consistent with distance negatively
affecting market timing ability for selling stocks. Finally, we show that the supe-
rior skill in selling stocks might be consistent with insider information. We sort our
observations into small positions and large positions subsamples, in which the fund
portfolio weights and the share of the fund in the total stock market capitalization are
taken into account. We argue that insider information is more important in the large
positions subsample and we run quantile regressions of the change in past weights
on future excess stock return for both subsets. As seen in Figure 3.5, the coefficient
for the 5% quantile for the large positions subsample is 4.641, which is considerably
higher than the 1.549 coefficient in the full sample regression. In the small positions
subsample, we don’t find market timing ability in the 5% quantile.
Academic research on information asymmetries has mostly focused on portfolio
performance rather than individual trades. But portfolio performance is likely to
reflect many separate investment decisions as well as the investment mandate and
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risk constraints of the entire fund. By unbundling the portfolio and moving to the
trade level, we can condition the analysis on individual trade and stock character-
istics; thus gaining in statistical precision. In particular, we can focus on the part
of the trade distribution of institutional investors which should be most informative
about any private information: large sell trades in stocks in which the investor was
previously holding a large stake. Institutional investors are most likely to obtain pri-
vate information in stocks in which they are important shareholders both in terms of
their own portfolio weight or in terms of the percentage of their ownership relative
to the market capitalization. Since positive information is not actionable for equity
funds which hold already a very large position and cannot trade in derivatives, it is
primarily negative private information which should trigger a large position change
and a strong negative correlation between institutional sell trades and consecutive
negative excess returns for the stock under consideration.
An alternative explanation for our results is that fund managers make systemati-
cally better market timing decisions for sell trades based on public information only.
But this interpretation of the data begs the question why the same managers are
unable to make informed buy trades in stocks in which they are not yet large share-
holders and thus benefit from a close interaction with corporate managers. While
we cannot exclude that the information processing skills of institutional investors are
fundamentally different for negative and positive corporate news, we believe that such
an interpretation has only very limited plausibility.
The clearest evidence that meetings between corporate officers and fund managers
provide trading advantages for the latter comes from a recent case study by Solomon
and Soltes (2012). For a single mid-size stock traded in the NYSE, they analyze the
entire meeting record of senior management with institutional investors from Novem-
ber 2004 to March 2010. The likelihood of a meeting between senior managers and a
fund manager increases with the fund’s investment position in the firm and decreases
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in geographical distance. Importantly, meetings with senior corporate officers improve
the market timing ability of the fund manager in this particular stock. While lack-
ing microdata on the local interaction between corporate officers and institutional
investors, we investigate the same market timing ability for a representative stock
sample covering a large proportion of the global institutional investor universe.
Security regulation on Fair Disclosure (i.e. Reg FD) passed in 2000 has as an
objective to prevent certain investors from gaining an unfair advantage in the financial
market through preferential access to information. While such regulation did not
prohibit one-on-one meetings between investors and corporate officers, it specifies
that all material information disclosed by the manager had to be publicly available
and accessible to all investors. Yet, since 2000, the SEC has brought only five cases
against firms for violating Fair Disclosure in regards to private meetings with investors
(Solomon and Soltes (2012)). Prosecuting fund managers for insider trading is also
very difficult notwithstanding a few rare and prominent recent cases. 1
Our study is linked to the literature that investigates whether mutual funds out-
perform the market in a persistent way, which is far from having a unique view.
Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1997) suggest that mutual funds, in special
aggressive-growth funds, possess some stock picking skills but not timing skills using
characteristic-based benchmarks, which are constructed using 125 passive portfolios
and then are matched to the funds portfolio based on the size, value and momentum
characteristics. Brown and Goetzmann (1995) find performance persistence in equity
mutual funds in a dataset free from survivorship bias and attribute it to funds that lag
passively the S&P500. Other papers, in contrast, argue that mutual fund managers
do not possess superior stock picking skills. Malkiel (1995) looks into equity mutual
1An example is the high profile court case against the fund manager Raj Rajaratnam in May
2011, who was found guilty of trading on corporate inside information. The jury verdict mostly relied
on self-incriminating telephone conversations rather than the trading pattern, which the defendant
justified as the result of public information and investment research.
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fund returns from 1971 to 1991 in a dataset free of survivorship bias and conclude that
mutual funds underperform the market even before accounting for reported expenses
with the exception of load fees. They also fail to detect persistence in mutual fund
performance for the 1980s, though they do for the 1970s. Gruber (1996) argues that
investing in the mutual fund industry is rational, as investors can make money even
when the average mutual fund underperforms: it is worth to invest in active mutual
funds as future performance is partially predictable from past performance. Carhart
(1997) dismisses the hot hands hypothesis, in which individual fund managers have
superior skills, in order to explain persistence in mutual fund performance. Using a
sample free of survivorship bias, he finds that persistence is down to expenses, trans-
action costs and common factors in stock returns. He also shows that funds that
follow momentum strategies do not earn superior returns. Our paper contributes by
investigating whether fund managers trades as reactions to future stock returns are
heterogeneous.
Our results strongly reject the homogeneity of portfolio weight changes as a func-
tion of future stock returns and find suggestive evidence linking it to insider infor-
mation fund managers might have access in boards of firms in which they hold an
important stake. In that respect, our paper relates to the literature that studies
private information of corporate executives. Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) argue that
positive abnormal returns following share repurchase programs can be explained by
the overreaction hypothesis, which states that stocks that suffered a severe price de-
cline in the 6 months leading to the repurchase are undervalued. The share repurchase
program is how firm managers’ send a signal to the market that the current public
information on the firm is worse than it should be.
We also show that funds that are more distant from the firms they invest in have
less access to private information. Other papers have similar findings. Hau (2001)
shows how distance affects stock trading profits. By using a detailed dataset that
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contains the location of traders that trade in the electronic trading system Xetra,
in Germany, he finds that traders located outside Germany underperform the ones
located in Germany, in special for the largest German blue-chip stocks. He further
finds evidence of informational advantage of proximity to corporate headquarters of
the traded stock for intraday trading. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) provide evidence
that mutual fund managers have superior information on local stocks. The average
fund manager earns a superior return for her local holdings relative to the nonlocal
ones. Also, local stocks held by the fund manager outperform local stocks not held by
her. Those effects are stronger if funds are smaller, have few holdings and are older.
Also, they are more pronounced in small cities and small locations, locations in which
outsiders would have a harder time obtaining information. They further show that
local ownership of stocks positively and significantly predict abnormal returns.
Our paper continues as follows. In Section 3.2, we lay out the hypothesis on hetero-
geneous market timing ability and propose how to test it. In Section 3.3, we describe
the data and the screening procedures we take. In Section 3.4, we discuss results
and argue how insider information might be linked to the heterogeneous responses in
mutual fund trades. Finally, in Section 3.5, we conclude.
3.2 Hypotheses
Survey evidence documents that managers of publicly traded firms spend consid-
erable time meeting investors – on average 17 and 26 days per year for chief executive
officers and chief financial officers, respectively. Such "informal contacts" can take the
form of public conference meetings sponsored by investment banks, or more private
meetings at corporate headquarters or direct at the investor’s office.
As documented by Solomon and Soltes (2012), large institutional investors are
more likely to have privileged access to top management. For a single U.S. com-
pany, they document that such meetings increase the market timing ability of the
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investors. Our first hypothesis is that such market timing ability is a general feature
of institutional trading:
Hypothesis 1: Information Advantage of Institutional Holders
Institutional investors have privileged information access to management
which improves their market timing ability. If they already hold a large
stake, their information advantage should primarily come from negative
information triggering block liquidations. Stock acquisitions are not infor-
mative trades if they generally precede access to inside information.
Institutional investors are likely to have limits with respect to the positions they
can take in any single stock. Having a large block enables them to obtain inside
information, but they may not be able to increase this position further on positive
news nor are they allowed to benefit from derivative trading in such a situation.
However, negative information about the firms prospects can be exploited as the
fund can liquidate or at least reduce its stake. Information advantages of institutional
investment therefore give rise to an asymmetric market time ability with respect to
position liquidations but not position acquisitions. The empirical part uses quantile
regressions to infer the correlation of the holding change with future excess returns
for different quantiles of the portfolio weight change. According to hypothesis 1,
the most negative portfolio weight changes should yield the highest correlation with
future excess returns.
Building a privileged relationship with top managers may nevertheless be a time
consuming activity, and more feasible for funds with relatively few stock investments.
A lower degree of portfolio diversification may also allow the manager to specialize
in companies which provide better private information flows to their block holders.
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Both arguments suggest that the asymmetric market timing ability of funds is more
pronounced for the less diversified funds:
Hypothesis 2: Information Advantage and Investor Diversifica-
tion
Less diversified investors have a larger incentive to solicit private infor-
mation from firm management and/or should pick stocks for which private
information is most abandoned. Liquidation of their stock holdings should
be particularly informative.
Firm management might also be more willing to pass inside information to in-
stitutional investors which hold large stakes in the firm. The size of the investment
share relative to the stocks market capitalization therefore provides an additional
dimension on which we can sort institutional investors:
Hypothesis 3: Information Advantage and Investment Size
Investors with large (or controlling) equity stakes in the corporation have
better access to management’s inside information. A fund’s timing ability
with respect to position liquidations should increase for funds with larger
stakes relative to the stock’s market capitalization.
In order to obtain evidence for both hypothesis 2 and 3, we can sort all fund
positions according to (i) their size relative to the fund capitalization and (ii) their
size relative to the stock capitalization. The empirical part will undertake a sorting in
terciles in both dimensions and report quantiles regressions for each of the 9 buckets.
We expect the bucket with the most concentrated fund positions and the largest equity
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stakes relative to stock capitalization to feature the highest sell/buy asymmetry with
respect to market timing ability.
Geographical distance makes it more difficult for fund managers to interact with
senior corporate managers. In their case study, Solomon and Soltes (2012) confirm
that the distance between the fund location and the corporate headquarter indeed
significantly reduces the probability of a meeting between senior managers of a single
firm and fund managers even within the U.S. The international scope of our holding
data provides an opportunity to test for international information asymmetries in
fund management:
Hypothesis 4: Information Advantage and Investor Location
Geographically distant investors find it relatively harder to obtain inside
information from management. Their negative holding changes should be
relatively less informative about future excess returns.
A geographical information advantage might also have its cause in aspects other
than the costs of physical encounter which increases in distance. Social networks
typically also have a geographical dimension and might re-enforce the information
disadvantage of fund managers in other countries. Similarly, language or culture
might also present additional barriers to tapping into the private information of senior
corporate managers. Unfortunately, our data lacks the detailed information on fund
managers and firm management to distinguish these aspects.
3.3 Data
Our data on mutual fund equity holdings come from the Thomson Reuters database,
which contains information on equity mutual funds worldwide. The sample contains
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half-yearly observations from 1999 to 2009. The holdings file records fund name, man-
agement company name, country code, and reporting date. In addition, it provides
the security number, security country code, shares outstanding, and number of shares
held by a fund. Reporting for most international funds occurs only at six-month in-
tervals, which obliges us to undertake the analysis at a semi-annual frequency. We
note that the Thomson Reuters data account for both pure equity funds and the eq-
uity holdings of balanced funds, which also hold other assets such as bonds. However,
such additional asset positions (other than equity) are not part of the data and cannot
be otherwise inferred. We also note that fund attribution of equity holdings might
slightly deviate from the reporting on international fund positions by the Investment
Company Institute (ICI), as can be seen in Figure 3.1. For example, some manage-
ment companies create subsidiary funds in other countries to distribute their fund
management services. The Thomson database treats such “feeder funds” as separate
entities and attributes them to their respective country of registration even if the ac-
tual investment management occurs elsewhere.2 We always retain the last reporting
date within the last 3 months of each semester3, even if the fund features multiple
reporting dates within a semester. The reported fund holdings are matched with the
end-of-semester stock price data from Datastream. All return calculations are based
on the total return index to account for dividend payments and capital measures.
We implement a series of filters in order to guarantee data reliability. First, we
eliminate all fund-semesters for which total net assets is less than US$ 10 Million,
as we think very small funds could bias our data. Second, we eliminate all highly
concentrated fund-semesters for which the Herfindahl index is above 20%4. Funds
2This aspect may explain the small discrepancies with respect to the number of funds per country
between our data and the fund statistics from the Investment Company Institute (ICI).
3If the last reporting date is within the first 3 months of a semester, we ignore the observation.
4We define the fund-semester Herfindahl index as Hf,t =
N∑
s=1
ω2f,s,t, in which ωf,s,t is stock s’s
weight in fund f’s portfolio in semester t. A very concentrated fund-semester has a high Herfindahl
index.
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with highly concentrated portfolios might have incentives which could bias our results.
Third, we delete observations that are probably data errors, such as negative holdings,
a single fund-semester-holding with value higher than US$ 30 Billion or observations
for which the cumulated 6-month stock return is lower than -80% or higher than
500%.
Table 3.1 summarizes fund holdings for December 2007 by mutual fund domicile.
A total of 19,296 funds reported stock positions with a combined total net equity
value of US$ 8.7 Trillion. Around 65% of the value of the reported equity holdings
in our sample concern U.S. domiciled funds. We classify as international funds all
fund-semesters than invest at least 10% of the value of the portfolio in foreign stocks.
The international funds represent 65% of all funds and hold around 62% of all assets
in our dataset in December 2007. Those numbers are slightly lower (42% and 54%,
respectively) for US funds, suggesting they are home-biased.
The fund coverage in the Thomson Reuters database is comparable to the Lion-
shares database used by Cremers, Ferreira, Matos and Starks (2011), who reported
total net equity assets of US$ 8.0 Trillion for December 2007. We can also compare
our reported aggregate country holdings to the ICI international fund statistics.5 The
correlation between our reported holdings and those reported by ICI (in logs of US$
Million of equity fund assets) is 96.0% across countries.
Finally, we adjust stock returns for international and local risk factors. We regress
each 6-month cumulated raw stock return on 8 factors: local market, local value, local
size, local momentum, non-local market, non-local value, non-local size and non-local
momentum. We then use the residual of this regression as our 6-month cumulated
risk-controlled stock return. The non-local factors are factors averaged across all
countries except the local one.
5See the 2011 Investment Company Factbook, 51st edition, pages 187-188, available at
www.icifactbook.org.
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The summary statistics on stock returns along with other control variables can be
found on Table 3.2. The dependent variable dw, the change in weights from month t-6
to month t, is multiplied by 1000 and can vary between -1000 and 1000. The control
variables are defined as follows. Home IF is the interaction of the dummy Home with
the dummy International Fund. The dummy Home assumes value 1 only and if only
fund and stock are located in the same country. The dummy International Fund
assumes value 1 only and if only a fund invests more than 10% of its TNA in foreign
stocks in a certain period. Foreign IF is the interaction of the dummy Foreign with
the dummy International Fund. The dummy Foreign assumes value 1 only and if only
fund and stock are not located in the same country. US IF, UK IF, Eurozone IF and
Other IF are the US, UK, Eurozone and Other countries dummies interacted with the
International Fund dummy, respectively. These country dummies assume value 1 only
and if only the fund is located in the country to which the dummy refers to. US refers
to the United States. UK refers to the United Kingdom. Eurozone refers to Austria,
Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia or Spain. Other countries refer
to all countries that are not the United States, the United Kingdom or one of the
Eurozone countries. Fund Size is the Total net assets in dollars held by the fund in
a certain period. Stock size is the total market capitalization in dollars of a stock
in a certain period. Fund positions is the number of stock positions held by a fund
in a certain period. All the listed control variables are also interacted with the risk
adjusted excess returns to form new control variables.
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3.4 Evidence on Information Asymmetries
Quantile regressions (QR) are ideally suited when there is likely to be a large
heterogeneity in responses to changes to a variable of interest6. This is precisely
the case in our application where there are many reasons to believe that differential
access to information, for example, may be an important unobserved determinant of
portfolio weight changes of mutual funds in reaction to changes in future expected
returns. Quantile regressions (see Koenker (2005)) yield different estimated slopes
which vary across the conditional distribution of the variable we seek to explain. An
additional advantage of using QR is that thes estimates are robust to non Gaussian
distributions of the error terms.
In our framework we are attempting to explain portfolio weight changes as a
function of future expected stock returns Rj,t+1. We define portfolio weight changes
as:
dwi,j,t =α +Rj,t+1 +Homei,j,t ∗ IFi,t + Foreigni,j,t ∗ IFi,t + FundSizei,t + StockSizej,t+
+NumberFundPositionsi,t +Homei,j,t ∗ IFi,t ∗Rj,t+1 + Foreigni,j,t ∗ IFi,t ∗Rj,t+1+
+FundSizei,t ∗Rj,t+1 + StockSizej,t ∗Rj,t+1 + FundPositionsi,t ∗Rj,t+1+
+t
in which dwi,j,t = wi,j,t − wi,j,t−1 is the change in the weight of stock j in fund i’s
portfolio from semester t-1 to semester t; Rj,t+1 is the stock j’s future risk-controlled
return7 from semester t to semester t+1; Homei,j,t is a dummy that takes value 1
only and if only fund i and stock j are located in the same country in semester t;
Foreigni,j,t is a dummy that takes value 1 only and if only fund i and stock j are not
located in the same country in semester t; IFi,t is an international fund dummy that
6For a very interesting use of QR in macroeconomics see Misra and Surico (2011). We thank
Paolo Surico for very helpful insights and follow largely here the discussion of Misra and Surico
(2011) on the usefulness of quantile regressions .
7We use 8 factors as risk controls: (local and non-local) interacted with (market, value, size and
momentum).
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takes value 1 only and if only at least 10% (in dollar terms) of the fund i’s portfolio is
invested in foreign stocks in semester t; Fund Sizei,t represents the aggregate value of
the fund i’s equity portfolio (measured in log of millions of U.S. dollars) in semester t,
Stock Sizej,t denotes the market capitalization of stock j (measured in log of millions
of U.S. dollars) in semester t, and Fund Positionsi,t measures (in logs) the number
of the fund i’s stock positions in semester t. Homei,j,t ∗ IFi,t is dummy that takes
value 1 only and if only an international fund i invests in a stock j located in the
same country in semester t. Foreigni,j,t ∗ IFi,t is dummy that takes value 1 only and
if only an international fund i invests in a stock j located abroad in semester t. All
control variables are included as interacted with the excess return (×Rj,t+1).
The quantiles of the potential distributions of weight changes conditional on co-
variates Rj,t+1, Xi,j,t are given by
Qdwijt/Rj,t+1,Xi,j,t(τ)
with τ in (0, 1) and Xi,j,t are control variables (including dummies).
The effect of an expected stock return change on different points of the marginal
distribution of the potential weight changes is
∂Qdwijt/Rj,t+1,Xi,j,t(τ)
∂R
The quantile regression model we are using is the following:
dwi,j,t = q (Rj,t+1, Xi,j,t, λi,j,t)
where λi,j,t conditional on Rj,t+1, Xi,j,t follows a uniform distribution on (0, 1) .
q (R,X, τ) is the conditional τ th quantile of dw given R = Rj,t+1, X = Xi,j,t.
The term λi,j,t parameterizes the unobserved heterogeneity across fund manager-stock
trades having the same characteristics Xi,j,t and reacting to the same expected future
adjusted return change Rj,t+1. It determines the relative ranking of fund-stock trades
in terms of portfolio weight changes.
119
For each quantile τ we specify the following linear model
Qdwijt(τ) = α1 (τ)
′Xi,j,t + α2 (τ)Rj,t+1
where our main interest lies in the estimated parameters α2 (τ) which we plot by
quantiles in Figure 3.2. If fund managers are price takers in the stock markets, the
α2 (τ) measure the causal effect of expected risk adjusted returns changes on portfolio
weight changes. holding the unobserved characteristic driving heterogeneity fixed at
λi,j,t = τ. Then
P (dw ≤ q (R,X, τ) /R,X) = P (λ ≤ τ/R,X) = τ
We present the results for both conditional and unconditional quantile regressions
in Table 3.3.
3.4.1 Heterogeneity in Market Timing Ability
The first observation is that in our sample there is wide heterogeneity in slopes:
looking only at the OLS estimates would miss an enormous amount of information
in our sample. In other words homogeneity of reactions of fund managers trades
is strongly rejected by the data. Second, for a non negligible part of the sample,
expected stock return changes do not lead to any portfolio weight adjustments (or
leads to very minor ones). Third, there are some "big winners" (as measure by a
strong positive correlation between expected returns and dw) and some "big losers"
(strong negative correlation between dw and expected returns).
According to hypotheses in Section 3.2, the size and direction of holding changes
are directly related to the information content of the respective trades. We run sepa-
rate quantile regression at the 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 90%, and 95% quantiles. The
baseline regression in Table 3.3, Panel A, includes the excess return in the consecutive
semester (R(t+ 1)) as the only regressor (apart from a constant).
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The regression coefficient for the excess return in Panel A decreases monotonically
from a highly significant positive coefficient of 1.549 for the 5% quantile to −5.029
for the 95% quantile. Figure 3.2 shows the quantile coefficient for future excess
return plotted for all quantiles; it shows an S-shaped pattern with highly significant
coefficients for the tail quantiles. The last column in Table 3.3, Panel A, reports the
OLS coefficient, which captures the mean covariance with the excess return. The
OLS coefficient is negative at −0.625 in contrast to the highly positive coefficient for
the 5% and 10% quantile.
We will now attempt to identify the characteristics of the funds which perform the
most successful stock picking. We rerun the the baseline regression in four different
subsamples: (i) only non-positive change in weights dwt ≤ 0; (ii) only positive change
in weights dwt > 0; (iii) only non-positive future excess stock returns Rt+1 ≤ 0; (iv)
only positive future excess stock returns Rt+1 > 0); We present results in Figure 3.3,
from which we can infer that stock picking skill is only present for non-positive values
of dwt and for non-positive values of ERt+1. Even stronger it is the pattern in (i)
and (ii), in which all the positive coefficients, associated with stock picking skills, are
on the non-positive range of dwt and all the negative coefficients are on the positive
range of dwt. While the pattern in (iii) and (iv) is still consistent with stock picking
abilities being only present when selling stocks (negative change in weights ahead of
future negative excess returns), the higher quantiles in (iii) suggest that some of the
future negative excess returns are not correlated with a negative change in weights.
The 4 subsamples quantile regressions are consistent with stock picking skill being
present only for negative change in past weights and negative future excess returns,
which seems to suggest that funds are skillful only when selling holdings. These
positive coefficients for large holding reductions confirm the market timing ability of
institutional investors with respect to asset selling (Hypothesis 1). On the other hand,
these institutional investors experience investment losses in the semester that follows
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large holding increases in the 90% and 95% quantiles of portfolio weight changes. The
latter effect could result from the price pressure which such large position increases
generate for the stock price in period t. Reversal of this stock price in the consecutive
period t + 1 can generate a negative conditional correlation for the upper quantiles
of portfolio changes.
In Panel B, the single coefficient on future excess return is split into various inter-
action terms. Interaction terms include (i) a constant, (ii) a dummy variable marking
international funds with a location matching the country of the stock’s incorporation
(Home IF ), (iii) a second dummy marking international funds for which fund loca-
tion and stock location differ by country (Foreign IF ), (iv) a control for Fund size
(log of fund assets), (v) a measure of Stock size (log of stock capitalization) and (vi)
fund diversification captured by the number of Fund positions (also in logs). The
specification in Panel B also includes these six variables separately without the excess
return as interaction term (not reported).
At each quantile, other trade characteristics apart from the portfolio weight may
influence market timing success. Other conditioning variables in Table 3.3, Panel B,
are the fund type, fund size, stock size and fund diversification change in parallel.
For example, more diversified funds might find it more difficult to build a privileged
relationship with senior managers of all the firms the fund is invested in. Interest-
ingly, the coefficient on the number of Fund positions in the 5% and 10% quantiles
is significantly lower. A decrease in the number of fund position by two standard
deviations (or 1.51) implies an increase in the market time ability at the 5% quan-
tile of 19.3% relative to the baseline coefficient of 1.549 in Panel A. On the other
hand, Fund size is associated negatively with market timing at the 5% quantile; an
increase by two standard deviations of the fund size (or 3.21) comes with a coeffi-
cient decrease of −0.244 or −15.7% relative to the baseline coefficient. We also note
that large stocks allow for better market timing of large portfolio weight reductions.
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Higher stock liquidity may limit the price impact of sell transactions.
The control variables show typically opposite signs for stock picking ability mea-
sured by the coefficients at the 90% and 95% quantile regressions. Funds with a
large number of Fund positions are much better in stock selection if they decide to
undertake a large portfolio weight increase. Since diversified funds are less likely
to engage in large weight changes, any such exceptionally big portfolio modification
may reflect private information and is indeed showing relatively better market timing.
Large funds tend to be better stock pickers for very large portfolio weight increases at
the 95% quantile, but for none of the quantiles below. Large stocks generally provide
less opportunity for successful weight changes except at the extreme 5% quantile.
3.4.2 International versus Domestic Block Holders
Table 3.3, Panel B, also includes fixed effects for international funds, which are
defined as those holding more than 10% of their portfolio share in foreign stocks.
International funds can undertake portfolio weight changes in stocks headquartered
in the country of the fund residence or they can modify portfolio weights for stocks
other than their fund residence. We define a weight change dummy as Home IF
or Foreign IF , respectively. International funds may have weaker relationships with
the corporate officers in any particular country, particularly if the stock’s headquarter
is geographically remote. According to Hypothesis 3, we therefore expect a negative
coefficient particularly for the 5% and 10% quantiles characterizing large portfolio
weight reductions. The regression control in Table 3.3, Panel B controls for observable
heterogeneity in fund size, stock size and the number of fund positions.
At the 5% quantile regression, the coefficient of the dummies as Home IF and
Foreign IF are−0.447 and−0.851, respectively. Compared to the baseline coefficient
of 1.549 in Panel A, this amounts to a 29% and 55% lower market timing ability for
both fund types, respectively. Particularly geographically distant funds therefore
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show a much weaker ability for market timing in their large sell transactions which is
both economically and statistically significant. On the other hand, the same funds are
good stock pickers when it comes to large positive weight changes as is evident from
the positive coefficients at the 90% and 95% quantiles. Interestingly, this stock picking
advantage for international funds does not differ much as to the distance of the stock
from the fund headquarter. The stock picking advantage of an international fund in
foreign stocks at the 95% quantile is roughly of the same magnitude as disadvantage
in stock liquidation at the 5% quantile of weight changes, namely 0.833 and −0.851,
respectively.
3.4.3 Market Timing by Block Holding Size
Funds with large block holdings in a particular stock have particular incentives
to solicit private information from company managers. If their holding share is also
large relative to the stock market capitalization of the company, that is likely to give
those funds more influence over management and potentially better access to private
information. In this section we sort all fund positions changes into terciles according
to original portfolio weight of the position (1 = small portfolio weights, 3 = large
portfolio weights). In a second sort, we distinguish terciles sorted on a funds’ original
fund investment relative to a stocks’ market capitalization (1 = small share holdings,
3 = large share holdings). This double sort yields nine buckets of portfolio weight
changes ranging from (1,1) for small positions (both in terms of fund size and stock
market capitalization) to (3,3) for large positions again relative to fund size and stock
market capitalization. If block holdings in (3,3) are the source of inside information,
then the market timing ability for position liquidations should manifest itself in this
group much more than in (1,1).
Table 3.4 reports quantile regressions for portfolio weight changes at the 5%, 10%,
90% and 95% quantiles starting from small positions (1,1) and large positions (3,3),
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respectively. Panel A provides the results for the baseline regressions with the excess
return (ER(t+1)) and a constant as the only regressors, whereas Panel B controls for
the fund type, fund size, stock size and fund diversification characteristics interacted
with the excess return. The quantile regressions for funds with large positions show
again the S-shaped pattern from Table 3.3, Panel A, but more pronounced. The
coefficient for the 5% quantile has increased to 4.641 relative to 1.549 in the full
sample of all weight changes. By contrast, weight changes corresponding to smaller
initial stock holdings relative to fund and stock size show no longer any ability for
market timing in portfolio weight reductions at the 5% quantile. Both groups show
negative timing ability for position increases at the opposite 95% quantile. Figure
3.5 provides the graphical illustration, where the coefficient plot as a function of the
regression quantile shows an S-shaped pattern for large initial position (right graph),
but not for funds which hold small positions (left graph).
3.5 Conclusion
In this article, we study the heterogeneity in market timing ability by mutual
fund managers. Our results unravel an interesting pattern in the response of portfo-
lio weight changes to future stock returns. First, we strongly reject the homogene-
ity of reactions of fund managers trades. Second, we show that the lower (higher)
conditional quantiles estimates of change in past portfolio weights given the future
stock expected returns are positive (negative), which is consistent with the existence
of some big winners (big losers). Further evidence is found for the winners-losers
pattern when we run quantile regressions in subsamples in which we restrict our ob-
servations to be only positive or only non-positive past change in portfolio weights or
future stock excess returns: only the subsample with only non-positive past change
in portfolio weights and the subsample with only non-positive future stock excess
returns show a positive significant estimate, which is consistent with stock picking
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skills, suggesting winners are only associated to selling positions.
We then investigate whether the selling skills might be linked to insider informa-
tion, which should be more relevant for funds that have important stakes at firms.
We split again our sample, now into large positions and small positions, sorted by
past portfolio weights and past institutional share of the firm’s market capitalization.
As expected, the quantile regression estimates in the large positions subsample show
a more pronounced winner-loser shape than in the whole sample, while the ones in
the small positions subsample are much flatter. This result suggests that large block
holdings and large portfolio weights might be a source of insider information.
Finally, further tests reinforce the insider information mechanism might be a
source of the superior skill for selling stocks. Consistent with previous studies, we
find that international funds, in special their foreign positions, underperform domes-
tic ones, as the acquisition of information gets harder the further the fund is from the
corporation’s headquarters.
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Figure 3.1: Total net assets of mutual funds (in Log(US$ Million)), aggregated by fund coun-
try domicile, in December 2007. The values reported come from two different sources:
in the horizontal axis, the total value of equity positions of all funds by country domi-
cile, according to Investment Company Industry (ICI) is shown; in the vertical axis, the
total value of equity positions of all funds by country domicile, according to Thomson
Financial is reported. The dotted line is a 45 degrees line.
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Figure 3.2: Excess Return Coefficient by Quantile - Baseline Regression. Plotted is the
regression coefficient for excess return in a quantile regression which regresses the port-
folio weight change (by quantile) in semester t on the excess returns in the consecutive
semester t+ 1.
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Figure 3.3: Excess Return Coefficient by Quantile - dwt or ERt+1 subsamples. Plotted
is the regression coefficient for excess return in a quantile regression which regresses
the portfolio weight change (by quantile) in semester t on the excess returns in the
consecutive semester t+1 for different subsamples. In the top left subsample, we restrict
it to only non-positive portfolio weight changes observations. In the top right subsample,
we restrict it to only positive portfolio weight changes observations. In the bottom left
subsample, we restrict it to only non-positive future excess return observations. In the
bottom right subsample, we restrict it to only positive future excess return observations.
The solid line represents the quantile regression estimates. The dashed line represents
the OLS coefficient estimate. The grey shaded area (which is almost invisible in this
figure due to the higher significance of estimates) represents the 95% confidence interval.
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Figure 3.4: Excess Return Coefficient by Quantile - International Home/Foreign Sub-
samples. The regression coefficients for excess return in a quantile regression which
regresses the portfolio weight change (by quantile) in semester t on the excess returns in
the consecutive semester t+1 are plotted. The displayed estimates are: on the left hand
side subplot international funds investing at home, and on the right hand side subplot
international funds investing abroad.
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Figure 3.5: Excess Return Coefficient by Quantile - Past Position Size Subsamples. The
regression coefficients for excess return in a quantile regression which regresses the port-
folio weight change (by quantile) in semester t on the excess returns in the consecutive
semester t + 1 are plotted. The displayed estimates are on the left hand side subplot
for a subset containing only the bottom tercile positions in semester t − 1, and on the
right hand side subplot for a subset containing only the top tercile positions in semester
t− 1. Positions have two dimensions and are sorted into terciles. The first dimension is
the fund portfolio weight and the second dimension is the the share of the stock held by
an individual fund. A small (large) position indicates the bottom (top) tercile in both
dimensions.
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Table 3.1: Number and Size of Equity Mutual Funds by Fund Domicile
This table presents the number of funds and total fund net assets value (in US$ Million) by fund domicile
in December 2007. A fund is classified as international if it invests at least 10% of its assets abroad.
All Funds Domestic Funds International Funds
Fund Domicile Number of TNA Number of TNA Number of TNA
Funds (US$ Million) Funds (US$ Million) Funds (US$ Million)
Argentina 50 6,280 3 1 47 6,280
Australia 151 38,200 94 27,500 57 10,600
Austria 125 6,170 12 1,420 113 4,760
Belgium 268 40,400 8 633 260 39,700
Bermuda 8 42,200 0 0 8 42,200
Brazil 699 52,000 696 50,100 3 1,980
Canada 999 354,000 450 115,000 549 239,000
Chile 110 3,850 38 1,780 72 2,070
China 137 112,000 137 112,000 0 0
Cyprus 2 17 0 0 2 17
Czech Republic 16 1,190 0 0 16 1,190
Denmark 228 50,000 16 2,510 212 47,500
Estonia 4 1,090 0 0 4 1,090
Finland 118 18,100 22 4,350 96 13,700
France 747 179,000 152 38,800 595 140,000
Germany 2,036 313,000 104 30,700 1,932 282,000
Greece 106 6,850 63 5,760 43 1,080
Hong Kong 153 101,000 0 0 153 101,000
Hungary 6 565 1 34 5 531
Iceland 2 179 0 0 2 179
India 276 53,300 267 42,000 9 11,400
Ireland 115 72,800 1 128 114 72,700
Italy 505 65,000 58 10,100 447 54,900
Japan 352 91,000 267 58,100 85 32,900
Latvia 3 11 0 0 3 11
Liechtenstein 62 4,120 0 0 62 4,120
Luxembourg 249 16,500 1 0 248 16,500
Malaysia 95 1,840 82 1,680 13 164
Mexico 92 7,980 65 6,280 27 1,700
Morocco 1 59 1 59 0 0
Netherlands 143 72,100 11 8,150 132 63,900
Norway 151 201,000 49 8,340 102 193,000
Philippines 5 346 5 346 0 0
Poland 48 11,400 26 4,510 22 6,870
Portugal 119 4,270 45 1,280 74 2,990
Saudi Arabia 1 248 1 248 0 0
Singapore 186 81,600 14 2,760 172 78,900
Slovenia 1 0 0 0 1 0
South Africa 118 23,700 25 3,880 93 19,800
Spain 3,189 53,900 452 11,300 2,737 42,600
Swaziland 2 37 0 0 2 37
Sweden 356 110,000 96 28,900 260 81,600
Switzerland 450 89,100 62 17,900 388 71,200
Taiwan, R.O.C. 96 5,890 93 5,750 3 132
Thailand 9 276 9 276 0 0
Turkey 2 37 2 37 0 0
United Kingdom 1,223 667,000 197 114,000 1,026 553,000
United States 5,482 5,710,000 3,155 2,610,000 2,327 3,100,000
Total 19,296 8,669,605 6,780 3,326,612 12,516 5,343,301
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics on Regression Variables
Reported below are the summary statistics. The change in weights from month t-6 to month t dw is multiplied by 1000
and can vary between -1000 and 1000. Raw returns are the stock returns between the current period and 6 months
later. Risk adjusted excess returns are the stock returns between the current period and 6 months later controlled for
risk factors. The risk adjustment is based on an eight factor international asset pricing model with the following factors:
domestic market, domestic size, domestic value, domestic momentum, non-local market, non-local size, non-local value and
non-local momentum. The non-local factors are factors averaged across all countries except the local one. The control
variables are as follows: Home IF is the interaction of the dummy Home with the dummy International Fund. The dummy
Home assumes value 1 only and if only fund and stock are located in the same country. The dummy International Fund
assumes value 1 only and if only a fund invests more than 10% of its TNA in foreign stocks in a certain period. Foreign IF
is the interaction of the dummy Foreign with the dummy International Fund. The dummy Foreign assumes value 1 only
and if only fund and stock are not located in the same country. US IF, UK IF, Eurozone IF and Other IF are the US,
UK, Eurozone and Other countries dummies interacted with the International Fund dummy, respectively. These country
dummies assume value 1 only and if only the fund is located in the country to which the dummy refers to. US refers
to the United States. UK refers to the United Kingdom. Eurozone refers to Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia or Spain. Other countries
refer to all countries that are not the United States, the United Kingdom or one of the Eurozone countries. Fund Size is
the Total net assets in dollars held by the fund in a certain period. Stock size is the total market capitalization in dollars
of a stock in a certain period. Fund positions is the number of stock positions held by a fund in a certain period. All the
listed control variables are also interacted with the risk adjusted excess returns to form new control variables. The sample
contain half-yearly observations from 1999 to 2009.
Variable Obs. Mean Median STD Min p25 p75 Max
dw 8,335,057 -.00399 .001506 13.11 -1,000 -1.317 1.428 431.8
Raw returns 8, 335, 057 .03266 .05596 .2508 −.8841 −.08277 .1811 .8113
Risk adjusted (excess) returns (ER) 8, 335, 057 −.03463 .0003076 .278 −2.069 −.1657 .1315 .9143
Controls
Home IF 8, 335, 057 .1576 0 .3644 0 0 0 1
Foreign IF 8, 335, 057 .5414 1 .4983 0 0 1 1
US IF 8, 335, 057 .1677 0 .3736 0 0 0 1
UK IF 8, 335, 057 .1019 0 .3025 0 0 0 1
Eurozone IF 8, 335, 057 .1518 0 .3589 0 0 0 1
Other IF 8, 335, 057 .1199 0 .3248 0 0 0 1
Fund Size 8, 335, 057 18.64 18.45 1.606 16.12 17.4 19.67 25.74
Stock Size 8, 335, 057 19.93 20.07 1.77 6.908 18.88 21.11 29.54
Fund Positions 8, 335, 057 4.941 4.682 1.255 1.792 3.912 5.948 8.487
Interacted Controls
Home IF × ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.004178 0 .1075 −2.038 0 0 .9142
Foreign IF × ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.02045 0 .2046 −2.069 −.02438 .01924 .9143
US IF × ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.006003 0 .1157 −2.04 0 0 .9143
UK IF × ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.003736 0 .09176 −2.038 0 0 .9133
Eurozone IF × ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.006105 0 .1037 −2.038 0 0 .9143
Other IF × ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.004608 0 .09808 −2.069 0 0 .9133
Fund Size× ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 .1159 .368 4.62 −48.44 −2.122 2.722 30.97
Stock Size× ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 .1172 .3698 4.852 −47.99 −2.31 2.922 28.41
Fund Positions× ER(t+ 1) 8, 335, 057 −.1633 .001391 1.416 −17.01 −.7835 .6211 7.744
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Table 3.3: Heterogeneity in Market Timing Ability
Reported are quantile regressions in which institutional fund holding changes in a semester t (measured as changes in the portfolio shares) are
regressed on a constant and the risk-adjusted excess return (ER) in semester t + 1. For each quantiles (q = 5%, 10%, 25%, 75%, 90% and 95%)
we report a specification with and without control variable. Home IF denotes a dummy for a holding change by an international fund for which
the stock (main) trading location and the fund incorporation are in the same country, whereas Foreign IF denote a dummy for holding changes
of international funds which are located in countries other than the main trading location of the stock. International funds (IF ) are defined as
those with at least 10% of their portfolio share in stocks traded outside their country of incorporation. Fund Size represents the aggregate value
of the fund’s equity portfolio (measured in log of millions of U.S. dollars), Stock Size denotes the market capitalization of the stock (measured in
log of millions of U.S. dollars), and Fund Positions measures (in logs) the number of the fund’s equity positions. In the extended specification,
all control variables are included as interacted with the excess return (×ER(t+ 1)) and as well as non-interacted terms (not reported). Standard
errors are provided below the estimates.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Quantile Regressions OLS
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant -15.569*** -8.022*** -1.852*** -0.074*** 2.041*** 8.601*** 15.396*** 0.05
[0.296] [0.14] [0.037] [0.012] [0.048] [0.125] [0.258] [0.068]
ER(t+ 1) 1.549*** 0.731*** -0.059*** -0.039*** -0.903*** -3.094*** -5.029*** -0.625***
[0.06] [0.033] [0.006] [0.002] [0.007] [0.036] [0.069] [0.018]
Level Controls No No No No No No No No
Obs. 8,335,057 8,335,057 8,335,057 8,335,057 8,335,057 8,335,057 8,335,057 8,335,057
Panel B: Conditional Specification
Quantile Regressions OLS
5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Constant -34.983*** -22.346*** -7.811*** -0.19*** 6.201*** 19.893*** 35.436*** -1.622***
[0.169] [0.103] [0.033] [0.018] [0.036] [0.097] [0.189] [0.111]
ER(t+ 1) 3.237*** 2.049*** 0.56*** 0.022 -1.196*** -1.944*** -2.71*** 0.914***
[0.338] [0.173] [0.07] [0.039] [0.074] [0.18] [0.383] [0.239]
Interacted Controls
Home IF × ER(t+ 1) -0.447*** -0.515*** -0.141*** 0.021** 0.351*** 0.779*** 0.829*** 0.052
[0.11] [0.048] [0.018] [0.009] [0.019] [0.053] [0.117] [0.047]
Foreign IF ×ER(t+ 1) -0.851*** -0.652*** -0.181*** 0.03*** 0.384*** 0.745*** 0.833*** 0.085**
[0.063] [0.031] [0.011] [0.006] [0.012] [0.033] [0.07] [0.035]
Fund Size× ER(t+ 1) -0.076*** -0.019*** 0.008*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 0.05*** 0.021**
[0.01] [0.006] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.012] [0.01]
Stock Size× ER(t+ 1) 0.041*** -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.091*** -0.174*** -0.28*** -0.158***
[0.011] [0.006] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.006] [0.013] [0.008]
Fund Positions× ER(t+ 1) -0.198*** -0.089*** -0.03*** 0.04*** 0.346*** 0.58*** 0.737*** 0.221***
[0.017] [0.009] [0.005] [0.003] [0.005] [0.011] [0.022] [0.013]
Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 8,480,047 8,480,047 8,480,047 8,480,047 8,480,047 8,480,047 8,480,047 8,480,047
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Table 3.4: Market Timing Ability by Position Size
We repeat the quantile regressions in Table 3.3 for two subsamples of large and small positions. Fund holdings at the beginning of period t
are sorted into three equal size terciles based their size (i) relative to the fund capitalization (fund position size) and (ii) relative to the stock
capitalization (stock position size). All positions which are in the large size group by both sorts are labeled “Large Positions” and those which are
in the small group by both sorts are labeled “Small Positions”. Separate quantile regressions are reported for both subsamples with and without
the controls described in Table 3.3. Standard errors are provided below the estimates.
Panel A: Unconditional Specification
Quantile Regressions
Large Positions Small Positions
5% 10% 90% 95% 5% 10% 90% 95%
Constant -27.403*** -16.491*** 11.991*** 22.861*** -0.414*** -0.299*** 0.911*** 3.618***
[0.94] [0.449] [0.403] [0.867] [0.009] [0.012] [0.03] [0.247]
ER(t+ 1) 4.641*** 2.513*** -4.499*** -6.909*** -0.023*** -0.017*** -1.364*** -4.598***
[0.269] [0.127] [0.112] [0.204] [0.002] [0.002] [0.071] [0.284]
Level Controls No No No No No No No No
Obs. 1,158,675 1,158,675 1,158,675 1,158,675 1,232,495 1,232,495 1,232,495 1,232,495
Panel B: Conditional Specifications
Quantile Regressions
Large Positions Small Positions
5% 10% 90% 95% 5% 10% 90% 95%
Constant -76.391*** -51.207*** 36.194*** 59.187*** -2.012*** -1.328*** 33.108*** 60.742***
[1.102] [0.499] [0.445] [1.071] [0.016] [0.019] [0.926] [0.565]
ER(t+ 1) 12.233*** 6.99*** 0.561 -0.272 0.26*** 0.172*** -0.803 -1.162
[2.259] [1.106] [0.972] [1.966] [0.036] [0.041] [0.522] [0.753]
Interacted Controls
Home IF × ER(t+ 1) -0.596 -0.825*** 0.516** 0.121 -0.016* 0.008 0.366** 1.163***
[0.719] [0.306] [0.252] [0.556] [0.008] [0.009] [0.185] [0.326]
Foreign IF ×ER(t+ 1) -3.187*** -1.818*** 1.31*** 2.323*** -0.004 0.008 0.571*** 1.247***
[0.474] [0.205] [0.183] [0.387] [0.005] [0.007] [0.156] [0.308]
Fund Size× ER(t+ 1) -0.268** -0.105 -0.367*** -0.435*** 0.002 0.001 0.024 -0.125***
[0.135] [0.066] [0.06] [0.125] [0.002] [0.002] [0.016] [0.022]
Stock Size× ER(t+ 1) 0.023 0.018 -0.26*** -0.256*** -0.011*** -0.007*** 0.045*** -0.006
[0.081] [0.045] [0.042] [0.087] [0.001] [0.001] [0.014] [0.017]
Fund Positions× ER(t+ 1) -0.67*** -0.611*** 1.746*** 1.735*** -0.016*** -0.01*** -0.174*** 0.282***
[0.188] [0.105] [0.099] [0.166] [0.003] [0.003] [0.045] [0.078]
Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 1,158,675 1,158,675 1,158,675 1,158,675 1,232,495 1,232,495 1,232,495 1,232,495
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